Consumer choice in the market for health insurance by Gee, Emily Rose
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2015
Consumer choice in the market for
health insurance
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/15440
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
Dissertation
CONSUMER CHOICE IN THE MARKET FOR HEALTH INSURANCE
by
EMILY ROSE GEE
A.B. Government, Harvard College, 2004
M.A. Political Economy, Boston University, 2010
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2015
Approved by
First Reader
Randall Ellis, Ph.D.
Professor of Economics
Second Reader
Laurence Kotlikoff, Ph.D.
Professor of Economics
Third Reader
Keith Marzilli Ericson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Markets, Public Policy, and Law
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to my dissertation committee for the guidance they have provided throughout
my studies at Boston University. Randy Ellis has provided me with a solid foundation in
health economics and, as he does for all his students, has encouraged me in all pursuits—be
it research, teaching, or work experience beyond campus—to become a well-rounded
economist. Larry Kotlikoff has reminded me to reach beyond the available data and seek
out answers to policy questions. Finally, Keith Ericson has been a role model for dedication
to innovative and timely research. This dissertation is a testament to their mentorship and
teaching; any errors and shortcomings are my own.
I have benefitted from advice and constructive criticism along the way from other
Boston University faculty, most notably Josh Lustig, Albert Ma, Wesley Yin, and James
Rebitzer. I also count among my most valuable teachers during the doctoral program fellow
students Timothy Bond, Francisco Pino, Denis Tkachenko, Olesya Baker, and Nilay Kafali.
My classmate Osea Giuntella was co-author of the first chapter, on Medicaid and im-
migrant networks. Osea and I are grateful for feedback from Daniele Passerman, Claudia
Olivetti, Michael Chernew, Anna Sinaiko, and paricipants at conferences of the Euro-
pean Association of Labor Economists, Midwest Political Science Association, the Asian
Meeting of the Econometric Society, and the International Health Economics Association
World Congress, as well as from Thomas Buchmueller and anonymous referees during the
publication process. Yanbei Xu was our reserach assistant.
Dean Schleicher and Donald Lockley of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management
assisted me in obtaining and understanding the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program
data used in my second chapter. I received a generous grant from the Boston University
Institute for Economic Development for purchase of the dataset, and Sarah Henly-Thomas
assisted me in coding the federal health plan information. For both that chapter and Chapter
iii
3, I received helpful suggestions from my peers the American Society of Health Economists
conferences. Timothy Layton was my collaborator in developing the study of young adult
dependent coverage that became Chapter 3.
I have been fortunate to spend the last two years in Washington, during this historic
time of healthcare reform implementation. With sincere regret for being unable to list here
all those in D.C. with whom I have the honor to work, I owe a special thanks to my U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services colleagues Nancy De Lew, Rick Kronick, Beth
Hadley, Arnie Epstein, Ken Finegold, Arpit Misra, and Ben Sommers.
My greatest supporters throughout this project have been my family. Thank you to
my parents, Glenn and Christina Gee, for their unwavering support and the interest they
have taken in my research. And to Andy Green, my husband: thank you for your patience,
encouragement, and friendship throughout this long journey.
iv
CONSUMER CHOICE IN THE MARKET FOR HEALTH INSURANCE
EMILY ROSE GEE
Boston University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2015
Major Professor: Randall Ellis, Professor of Economics
ABSTRACT
A key feature of the market for health insurance is selection: a consumer’s decision to
purchase coverage can affect the costs for producers and the prices faced by other consumers.
In three essays, I explore factors that influence consumers to take up insurance coverage,
selection in market where a new insurance product was introduced, and the effects of a
recent policy to expand coverage among young adults.
The first essay examines whether language barriers and network effects can explain
disparities in Medicaid participation among low-income immigrants. Using the American
Community Survey, I show that linguistic networks facilitate Medicaid enrollment among
non-English speaking adults. The identification method follows Bertrand et al. (2000) and
employs local variation in the density of immigrant populations and nationwide variation
in Medicaid participation among ethnic groups. I also find that the availability of foreign-
language Medicaid information online is associated with significantly higher participation.
The second essay examines consumer choice in the context of a health insurance
exchange. Using data from the Federal Employees Health Benefits program, I examine
the extent to which the sudden introduction of high-deductible plans into the system in
2004 may have generated adverse selection. While entry by the newer plan type does not
appear to affect premiums of more traditional plan types for federal workers, enrollees in
high-deductible plans are more likely to be younger and male.
The final essay analyzes one of the earliest coverage-related provisions of the Affordable
v
Care Act to take effect, the extension of health insurance coverage to child dependents up
to age 26. Survey data reveal the law resulted in a marked increase in the number of young
adults covered by private insurance. Analysis of medical claims data from private health
insurance shows a relative decrease in average spending among young adults after the law
took effect, implying that the dependent coverage provision brought healthier young adult
individuals into the risk pool.
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Chapter 1
Medicaid and Ethnic Networks
1.1 Introduction
Uninsured immigrants present a challenge to U.S. efforts to expand health insurance
coverage. Compared with native-born citizens, immigrants are more likely to be uninsured
and less likely to have regular sources of health care (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008; Long
et al., 2010). Although the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act establishes
a mandate for insurance, universal coverage may remain elusive. Even in Massachusetts,
the first state to set an individual mandate, an estimated 38% of potentially Medicaid-
eligible immigrants remained uninsured two years after the state’s 2006 reform.1 It is
important to understand differences in take-up within the adult population and, in particular,
among those disproportionately uninsured—including racial minorities, non-citizens, and
individuals of limited English proficiency. Previous studies have shown that communication
problems hinder immigrant enrollment in welfare programs (Ponce et al., 2006; Aizer,
2007; Lavarreda et al., 2006). In this paper, we adopt methods developed by Bertrand et al.
(2000) to investigate the role of social networks in immigrant participation in Medicaid.
In the context of social science, two common channels through which networks influence
individual behavior are information and norms. We believe both play a role in the case of
Medicaid. If immigrants rely on networks for information about public programs, then
language barriers and distrust in authorities should be less problematic for those who have
access to larger and more informed networks. By ruling out shared norms within ethnic
1This estimate is our own using the 2008 American Community Survey. We consider “potentially eligible”
those immigrants below the 300% of the federal poverty level and not covered by private insurance, the same
definition as Long et al. (2010).
2groups, we can identify residual peer effects that can be attributed to differences at the local
level, including exchange of information.
Beyond legal and informational barriers to Medicaid enrollment, immigrants may
also hesitate to sign up because they distrust government authorities or because they fear
deportation. Public program participation has been found to be correlated with the policy
climate (Kaushal and Kaestner, 2005; Mazzolari, 2004; Kandula et al., 2004). In particular,
Watson (2010) provides evidence that “chilling effects” from immigration policy may widen
disparities in Medicaid enrollment across states. She shows that around the time of the
1996 welfare reform, non-citizen participation in Medicaid declined further in states where
immigration laws were more strictly enforced.
A rich literature describes the influence of ethnic groups and cultural networks on
individual preferences and economic behavior (Borjas, 1995; Edin et al., 2003; Munshi,
2004; Andersson et al., 2010; Jackson and Scheider, 2011). Ethnic networks can help
immigrants overcome language barriers and their distrust of authorities, acting as conduits
for information and encouraging participation in public programs (Figlio et al., 2011)
and the use of the health care system (Devillanova, 2008; Deri, 2005). Bertrand et al.
(2000) studied network effects on participation in the welfare system. The authors used
U.S. Census microdata to calculate the proportion of people receiving income from public
assistance in various immigrant communities. They found that the receipt of welfare
income was more common among immigrants who lived in enclaves and who were of
an ethnicity characterized by a relatively high welfare-participation rate. Using similar
methodology, Deri (2005) confirmed network effects on health-care utilization among
immigrants in Canada. Aslund and Fredricksson (2005) studied a natural experiment for
welfare participation among refugees in Sweden and claimed that it is mostly the quality of
the contacts (measured as average welfare use in the group) that explains network effects.
3The degree to which the peer effects in these studies arise from information-sharing,
rather than from spurious correlation, remains debated. Aizer and Currie (2004) disputed
the causal effects of ethnic networks on receipt of public assistance. Using data from a
California pre-natal care program, the authors showed that the supposed network effects
were larger among women who previously participated in the program than among first-
time users. Some recent studies using microdata have confirmed the information-sharing
hypothesis. Devillanova (2008) found network effects for health-care utilization among
undocumented immigrants in Milan, using data from a survey that asked respondents
whether they had obtained information from friends or relatives. Figlio et al. (2011)
found strong evidence that social networks mitigated the “information shock” faced by
immigrant women in Florida following the 1996 welfare reform. These findings suggest
that network effects are weaker when information is widespread and have greater influence
when information is scarce.
We contribute to this literature with evidence from the American Community Survey
(ACS). With the ACS, which began collecting information on health insurance coverage
in 2008, we have a new tool for understanding disparities in insurance rates among ethnic
groups across the United States. While much past analysis of uninsured immigrants has
been based on relatively small sample sizes or on the limited reach of state-based public
programs, the ACS allows us to look at the Medicaid program nationwide while taking
advantage of local variation and a large number of ethnic networks.
Consistent with previous literature on public assistance, we provide evidence that social
networks are important in explaining variation in Medicaid enrollment among immigrants.
Our study is of particular importance given changes in migration patterns. As new waves
of immigrants are locating to areas without established immigrant communities, many may
face challenges in becoming settled (Massey, 2008). Furthermore, we believe that it is
4valuable to focus on Medicaid for at least two reasons.
First, while we believe the ethnic networks have similar effects for both welfare and
Medicaid, the rules governing public assistance have changed radically since 1990, the year
studied by Bertrand et al. (2000). The 1996 reform, with which President Clinton promised
to end “welfare as we know it,” was designed to encourage recipients of government
assistance to seek employment. Only 3% of our sample of potentially Medicaid-eligible
immigrants reports having received welfare income in the past year.2 In addition, the
law limited immigrants’ access to federally funded public assistance, including Medicaid
(Borjas, 2002). We find evidence that among potentially eligible immigrants, the probability
of Medicaid coverage is greater for individuals living in a linguistic enclave and whose
language group is characterized by a high Medicaid enrollment rate. While previous studies
focused on programs aimed at women or children (Aizer and Currie, 2004; Aizer, 2007),
we confirm the presence of network effects among a broader population.
Second, Medicaid expansion is a key vehicle for expanding coverage to the uninsured
in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. At a minimum, expanded Medicaid
programs cover adults up to 133% of the federal poverty level.3 Implementation of this
policy requires outreach to the uninsured and an understanding of how information is
shared and of who is most likely to remain uninformed. In addition to expanding eligibility,
PPACA is also expected to spur enrollment among those who were eligible even before
the reform, pulling them “out of the woodwork” through information campaigns and the
individual mandate (Sommers and Epstein, 2011).
In this paper, we look for a differential effect in participation across networks, modifying
the methods developed by Bertrand et al. (2000). Our approach exploits variation in the
2Of the Medicaid enrollees in our sample, 10% report receiving welfare. About 70% of welfare recipients
report having Medicaid.
3In the 2012 case Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, the Supreme Court ruled that the
federal government could not require states to expand Medicaid.
5concentration of immigrant communities and in the Medicaid enrollment rates of different
ethnic groups. We also test instrumental variables to address any selection that would
occur if immigrants sorted themselves differentially into enclaves. Our instrument is based
upon Bertrand et al. (2000), but we slightly modify their strategy to better address the
reflection problem and the possibility of random group shocks in the error term. We
also discuss an alternative approach to these problems using a measure of ex ante peer
characteristics—specifically, past data on Medicaid enrollment—in our robustness checks.
While the data we have do not allow us to pin down the exact contribution of norms
and information, our analysis does support that information is a key channel through which
networks influence Medicaid enrollment. Network effects are strong even when we control
for states’ publication of Medicaid information in other languages. Our results also suggest
that network quality has the strongest influence on individuals who are less likely to obtain
Medicaid information through formal channels and who are least assimilated. Depending
on the specification, we find little or no effect among immigrants who have been in the U.S.
longer, are proficient in English, or are U.S.-born.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data. We explain
our model in Section 3 and present the main results in Section 4. In Section 5, we conduct
several robustness checks and some sensitivity analyses. Section 6 concludes our study.
1.2 Data
We use the 2008 and 2009 American Community Survey (ACS), which is available from the
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al., 2010). The ACS, a random sample
of 3 million households, is conducted annually by the U.S. Census Bureau. Compared to
other data sets with health insurance information, the ACS provides the advantages of being
a nationwide survey and having a large sample size. These facts allow us to examine the role
6Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
enrolled in Medicaid 0.19 0.39 0 1
male 0.50 0.50 0 1
age 38.48 11.59 19 64
high school drop-out 0.47 0.50 0 1
high school graduate 0.26 0.44 0 1
some college 0.13 0.33 0 1
college or more 0.14 0.35 0 1
married, present 0.46 0.50 0 1
married, absent 0.07 0.26 0 1
widowed 0.02 0.14 0 1
divorced 0.08 0.27 0 1
separated 0.05 0.21 0 1
never married 0.33 0.47 0 1
number of children 1.28 1.43 0 9
child present 0.40 0.49 0 1
single mother 0.04 0.20 0 1
white 0.49 0.50 0 1
black 0.05 0.22 0 1
years in U.S. 15.06 10.72 0 65
more than 5 years in U.S. 0.80 0.40 0 1
fluent 0.48 0.50 0 1
MSA CA 3.14 4.30 0.03 85.30
PUMA CA 8.30 26.58 0.05 476.13
log(MSA CA) 0.69 0.92 -3.42 4.45
log(PUMA CA) 1.13 1.22 -3.02 6.17
Notes: Data source: 2008 and 2009 American Community Survey. For the top portion of the table, the sample is composed of non-
English-speaking immigrants ages 19 to 64 below the 200% of FPL who belong to a language group with more than 50 observations
remaining after imposing all other criteria and who live in a state that provides Medicaid-type coverage to immigrants (see Section 2).
Individuals living in non-identified MSAs and the institutional population are excluded from the sample. The final sample consists of
118,803 individuals. In the lower portion of the table, the contact availability measures are calculated as described in Section 2. “Child
present” is a dummy that equals 1 if an individual has any children. Our dummy variable for fluency equals 1 for individuals who speak
English “well” or “very well.” The means reported in the lower panel of the table refer to the CA for individuals in the final sample.
7of network effects across all states and dozens of ethnic groups. The ACS is appropriate for
our purposes because it contains individual-level information on health-insurance coverage,
location, and language.
The ACS asks respondents which language they speak at home, allowing us to identify
linguistic enclaves and to test for network effects within them. Strictly speaking, the
“language groups” we use are not ethnic categories. The Spanish group contains Spaniards
as well as Mexicans and Salvadorans, while Indians are represented by a multitude of
languages. In most cases, however, language- and culture-based groupings do coincide.
Using answers from the questions “Does this person speak a language other than
English at home?” and “What is this language?”, we build two alternate measures of
network availability. The first is based on metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and the
second on public use microdata areas (PUMAs), the smallest geographic unit available to
us in the ACS. A typical PUMA has a population of about 100,000 and can be thought of
as a large neighborhood within an MSA. For example, the MSA that contains New York
City also reaches into New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The New York MSA is broken down
into dozens of PUMAs. In lower Manhattan alone, Greenwich Village, Chinatown, and the
Financial District represent three separate PUMAs.
We capture network strength as “contact availability” (CA), adopting our definition
from Bertrand et al. (2000). CA is the logarithm of the local proportion of people speaking a
given language, relative to the national share of that language’s speakers. Formally, network
density is computed as follows:4
ln(
C jkt/A jt
Lkt/Tt
) (1.1)
where C jkt is the number of people in area j at time t speaking language k and A jt is the
4Our results are not sensitive to the exact specification of CA. In Table 1.11 we provide robustness checks
using different measures of concentration, including a non-log measure and a non-normalized measure.
8total population of area j at time t. As Bertrand et al. (2000) do, we normalize the local
density by the the national level density of language group. The denominator Lkt/Tt is the
share of population living in the United States and speaking language k at time t.
Our calculation for CA is based on the entire ACS population because the relevant
network for information dissemination is all speakers of a language, not just those who are
Medicaid-eligible.5 For all other parts of our analysis, we pare down the ACS to potentially
Medicaid-eligible immigrants, broadly defined. We focus on first-generation immigrants
by excluding anyone born in the United States.6 Because we are interested in linguistic
networks, we drop individuals whose primary language spoken at home is English. We
then keep only individuals who are non-institutionalized, non-elderly adults (ages 19 to
64 years old). It is also necessary to drop those living outside identifiable MSAs for our
identification procedure.
Describing the remaining criteria for our sample necessitates a brief discussion of
Medicaid eligibility rules. Medicaid was created to assist the low-income, low-asset
population. While each state designs and administers its own program, all must comply
with the federal minimum levels of provision, based on the federal poverty level. The
poverty level is not a single number but a sliding scale based on income and household
size, and the threshold for eligibility also varies by demographic group. For example,
in 2009 the federal minimum was 235% of the FPL for children, 185% for pregnant
women, 64% for working parents, 38% for non-working adults, and 75% for the elderly
and disabled. While the bulk of Medicaid enrollees are women and children, a legacy of
5Summary statistics on contact availability measures are presented in the lower panel of Table 1.1. These
measures are consistent with other findings in the literature (Bertrand et al., 2000).
6We find only small or no effects among second-generation immigrants, depending on the definition of
the network. This finding, discussed later in the paper, is consistent with our intuition that linguistic networks
should have less influence on the behavior individuals who can easily communicate in English or who have
greater familiarity with American culture. We also tested our model on a more restrictive sample that included
only foreign-born U.S. citizens, and our findings were similar.
9the historical link between Medicaid eligibility rules and those of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, the elderly and disabled account for 70% of Medicaid expenditures
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010).
The welfare reform act of 1996 bars most immigrants from receiving federally supported
Medicaid until they have resided in the United States for 5 years. Any state that wishes
to cover immigrants during that initial period must do so with its own dollars. States
are allowed to use federal money to provide Medicaid to qualified immigrants who have
been in the U.S. for at least 5 years. In 2008 and 2009, 7 states restricted Medicaid
access to immigrants even after the 5-year bar: Alabama, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio,
Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming (Broder and Blazer, 2009). We exclude these states from
our analysis.7 Unfortunately, the ACS does not have sufficient information to determine
Medicaid eligibility with precision. In order to focus on those who potentially have the
option of Medicaid as their primary form of insurance, we further restrict the sample to
households below the 200% of the FPL and individuals who have been in the country for at
least 5 years.8 Finally, we use only language groups with more than 50 observations after
imposing all other restrictions.9
Our final sample comprises 37 language groups, 164 MSAs, 1,218 PUMAs, and 118,803
individuals. Within the sample, 21% are covered by Medicaid. We report descriptive
statistics for our main variables of interest and our controls in Table 1.1 at the end of this
chapter. There is substantial variation in insurance status across language groups (see Table
1.2). The average Medicaid enrollment ranges from around 10% for speakers of Korean,
German, and Gujarati to over 40% among the Armenian, Bengali, Cushite, Cantonese,
and Miao language groups. Spanish speakers account for nearly three-quarters of final
7However, including the residents of these states in the sample has little impact on our results because any
state-level policy discrepancies are absorbed by the PUMA and MSA fixed effects in our model.
8As discussed later in the paper, we conduct tests using other cutoffs of the FPL.
9Our results are not sensitive to raising or lowering this threshold for language group size.
10
sample (83,740 people), and are far more numerous than the next-largest groups: Chinese
(3,862),10 Vietnamese (3,546), Korean (2,552), Filipino (2,282), and Arabic (2,146).
Table 1.2 shows descriptive statistics for insurance coverage by language group. Though
the sample used for our model excludes individuals with private insurance, in Table 1.2, we
show the insurance status for all immigrants in the ACS (i.e., our sample for the calculation
of CA) who live in identifiable MSAs and speak one of the 37 languages included in the
restricted sample. Spanish-speaking immigrants have an especially high proportion of
uninsured individuals (62%).
1.3 Empirical Specification
The network effect in our model is represented as interaction between the local density
of people who share a language and their “culture” with respect to Medicaid. Bertrand
et al. (2000) define a network measure that captures both the “quantity” and the “quality”
of contacts in a given language group. Following the model from Bertrand et al. (2000), we
express this as:
network jkt =CA jkt ×Medicaidkt(−i) (1.2)
CA jkt , the measure of network availability can be thought of as a network quantity
measure. Network quality is represented by Medicaidkt(−i), the Medicaid enrollment rate
of the language group, expressed as a deviation from the the average of the entire sample
over all groups. Although we are concerned with the peer effect that occurs at the local level,
we use the nationwide Medicaid enrollment rate for each language as a proxy for cultural
attitudes toward public assistance. Using the local Medicaid enrollment rate potentially
10We follow the ACS convention and leave “Chinese” as a category distinct from Cantonese, Formosan,
and Mandarin. Combining all dialects into a single Chinese-language group does not affect our results.
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Table 1.2: Health Insurance Coverage by Language
Language % Private insurance % Medicaid % Uninsured Individuals
Spanish 0.22 0.17 0.62 83,740
Chinese 0.44 0.23 0.34 3,862
Vietnamese 0.33 0.31 0.36 3,546
Korean 0.41 0.11 0.49 2,552
Filipino, Tagalog 0.55 0.14 0.31 2,282
Arabic 0.29 0.33 0.38 2,146
French 0.32 0.16 0.52 2,071
Russian 0.33 0.32 0.36 1,776
Cantonese 0.32 0.43 0.28 1,367
Portuguese 0.29 0.20 0.52 1,268
French 0.46 0.16 0.38 1,197
Mandarin 0.37 0.25 0.41 1,028
Hindi 0.55 0.12 0.33 790
Polish 0.31 0.17 0.50 776
Urdu 0.27 0.30 0.44 755
Persian 0.32 0.29 0.39 726
Bengali 0.31 0.47 0.28 681
Armenian 0.21 0.43 0.35 649
Kru 0.38 0.17 0.45 605
Japanese 0.67 0.05 0.28 600
Mon-Khmer 0.32 0.40 0.26 597
German 0.58 0.12 0.28 537
Panjabi 0.32 0.23 0.45 535
Miao, Hmong 0.31 0.47 0.23 505
Amharic 0.34 0.19 0.46 498
Italian 0.55 0.16 0.27 463
Gujarati 0.42 0.12 0.47 445
Thai 0.49 0.08 0.44 340
Ukrainian 0.27 0.25 0.48 294
Turkish 0.42 0.23 0.37 294
Albanian 0.32 0.24 0.44 289
Cushite 0.19 0.60 0.23 283
Laotian 0.38 0.29 0.28 282
Rumanian 0.35 0.17 0.47 278
Hebrew 0.58 0.20 0.22 270
Serbo-Croatian 0.54 0.17 0.28 242
Greek 0.57 0.21 0.22 234
Total 0.26 0.19 0.55 118,803
Notes: Data source: 2008 and 2009 American Community Survey. The sample is defined as in Table 1.1.
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creates an omitted variable bias because the average enrollment of language group k in area
j could be correlated with unobservable characteristics individual i shares with others in
the immediate vicinity (Bertrand et al., 2000).
Our main specification is a linear probability model:
Medicaidi jkt = (CA jkt ×Medicaidkt(−i))α+Xi jktβ +CA jktθ
+ γ j +δk + τt + εi jkt (1.3)
where i is the subscript for individuals, j for geographic areas, k for languages, t for
time. Dependent variable Medicaidi jkt is binary and equal to 1 for a person covered by
Medicaid.11
Adopting the notation of Bertrand et al. (2000), we use fixed effects γ j for geographic
units and δk for languages, which allows us to control for potential unobserved differences
between localities and between language groups. We also include a dummy variable for
year, τ . The PUMA fixed effects control for institutional sources of variation in Medicaid
enrollment, for any state-level differences in Medicaid rules, and for the effect of “welfare
magnets” (Borjas, 1999). Using language group fixed effects allow us also to take into
consideration possible omitted characteristics of the language group, such as cultural
attitudes toward assimilation or welfare dependence. Through the contact availability
measure CA jk on the right-hand side, the model also accounts for any omitted individual-
level characteristics that may be correlated with the likelihood of living in an ethnic enclave.
As in other peer-effects studies, this model would still suffer omitted variable bias if
CA jkt×Medicaidkt(−i) were correlated with unobserved individual characteristics (Bertrand
11The ACS asks, “Is this person currently covered by any of the following types of health insurance or
health coverage plans?” We consider the respondent to be on Medicaid if they selected the multiple-choice
answer ”Medicaid, Medical Assistance, or any kind of government-assistance plan for those with low incomes
or a disability.”
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et al., 2000). Living in an ethnic enclave could be associated with different traits in the
culture of high- or low-enrollment groups. We illustrate differential selection with the
following example. Suppose that for members of high-Medicaid language groups, living
in an ethnic enclave is associated with being more dependent on the local community and
also on public assistance. For low-Medicaid language groups, however, those in enclaves
have a culture of self-reliance, and for them, enclaves have with relatively low use of
public assistance. If such selection existed as described, it would bias upward our estimate
of network effects because we cannot observe and control for cultural attitudes toward
autonomy. We would be capturing spurious correlation because members of high-Medicaid
ethnicities who place less value on self-reliance are more likely to live in enclaves.
Another concern with peer-effects modeling is the reflection problem (Manski, 1993),
which occurs when a specification incorrectly attributes network effects to what are actually
correlations due to unobserved group-level shocks. While our model does not allow us
to distinguish endogenous effects (influenced by group behavior) from exogenous effects
(influenced by group characteristics), we do address the reflection problem by excluding
individual i from the computation of Medicaidkt .12 Correlated errors within groups can
be troublesome for statistical inference (see Angrist and Pischke (2008)). In our case, a
shock that affects all members of a language group in a local area would bias our estimates
through spurious correlation.
For these reasons, we test an instrumental variables specification in addition to the
ordinary least squares model. Following Bertrand et al. (2000) and Evans et al. (1992),
our IV involves contact availability at the two local geographic divisions available to us:
the smaller PUMA and larger MSA. We use MSA-level CA as an instrument for both
the PUMA-level CA and the PUMA-level CA jkt ×Medicaidkt interaction term. Unlike
12In an abuse of notation, from here onward we will refer to the mean Medicaid rate simply Medicaidkt
rather than Medicaidkt(−i).
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Bertrand et al. (2000), however, we exclude PUMA j itself when calculating the MSA-level
concentration for the instrument for PUMA j. By doing so, we avoid contaminating the
instrumental variable with any common shock that affected PUMA j while still retaining
MSA-level idiosyncrasies.
Our IV identification rests on the assumption that selection at the PUMA level is greater
than selection at the MSA level (Bertrand et al., 2000). The concentration of an ethnic
group in a PUMA is correlated to concentration of the group in the corresponding MSA,
but if differential selection were driving the results, then the OLS would overestimate the
network effects. The IV specification allow us to detect whether even in the presence of
differential selection there are network effects among language groups. An alternative
identification method to address the reflection problem, in which we use lagged variables
as a proxy for current Medicaid use, is discussed in Section 5.
1.4 Main Results
The main parameter of interest in our linear probability model is α , the coefficient on the
interaction of CA jkt with Medicaidkt . The term captures the multiplier effect that is greatest
when an enclave is dense and its members come from a culture of widespread Medicaid
use.
We show our estimates from our baseline model and some variations in Table 1.3. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the PUMA or MSA level as appropriate for the specification.13
Our first step was to look for network effects at the PUMA level in an ordinary least squares
regression, the results of which are shown in Column 1. The network effect has a coefficient
of 0.19 and is significant at the 1% level.
13All results were generated with Stata Statistical Software, Release 11, using the ACS person weights
with the aweight option. We also tried dual-level clustering by PUMA and language, by language only, and
by PUMA and household. Our results were similar to the baseline.
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Table 1.3: Main Results
Dependent Variable: Medicaid Enrollment
(1) (2) (3)
CA measure: log PUMA log MSA log MSA
Methodology: OLS IV OLS
CA×Medicaid 0.186*** 0.343*** 0.240***
(0.027) (0.047) (0.032)
CA 0.008*** 0.006 0.008***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
male -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
fluent -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.025***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
child present -0.014** -0.014** -0.015***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
number of children in household 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
high school drop-out 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.060***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
high school graduate 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.040***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
some college 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.031***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
years in U.S. 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
years in U.S.2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
more than 5 years in U.S. -0.008 -0.008* -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
single mother 0.084*** 0.090*** 0.090***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
age -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age2/100 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
white 0.004 0.004 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
black 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.057***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
PUMA F.E. YES YES YES
Language Group F.E. YES YES YES
Year F.E. YES YES YES
Citizenship status YES YES YES
Marital status YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.180 0.180 0.166
Observations 118,803 118,803 118,803
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Data source: 2008 and 2009 American Community Survey. The sample is defined as in Table 1.1. MSA-level CA and MSA-
level CA×Medicaid are used as instruments for CA and CA×Medicaid at the PUMA level, respectively. First-stage estimates are
reported in Table 1.10 in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the PUMA level.
16
The model includes fixed effects for year, language groups, and geographic areas, as
well as standard socioeconomic and demographic controls.14 Specifically, our controls
include age and its quadratic, and dummies for education, marital status, single-motherhood,
the presence of a child in the household, the number of children ever born, race, and U.S.
citizenship.15 We also include the number of years since arrival in United States, and to
account for non-linear effects of residency in the United States, dummy for having resided
in the U.S. for more than 5 years and the quadratic of years since arrival. As expected,
variables associated with lower socioeconomic status increase the likelihood of Medicaid
coverage. High-school drop-outs are more likely to be on Medicaid, as are single mothers.
Being white is associated with lower probability of being on Medicaid, while having more
children and being divorced or never married are associated with a higher probability of
enrollment.
If individuals could costlessly self-select geographically, and sort themselves differen-
tially across language groups, then OLS estimate would be biased from selection at both
the MSA and the PUMA levels. Any bias that remains in the coefficient of the IV model,
presented in Column 2 of Table 1.3, would come from MSA-level selection. Instrumenting
with MSA-level contact availability produces a network coefficient of 0.34 and does not
change the sign of the coefficients on the control variables.16 If anything, the increase in the
size of the network effect suggests that OLS underestimates the network effect on Medicaid
enrollment and that differential selection cannot completely explain our results. The IV
results support the hypothesis that living in an area with a concentration of high-enrollment
14We also tested each year separately. The results for individual years do not substantially differ from the
results using the pooled data.
15Our baseline specification does not include income as a control. We did, however, test what happens
when we do include the logarithm of the sum of weekly income of all family members in the household. Only
half our sample has non-missing wage data, and among those we find similar network effects.
16Using the IV from Bertrand et al. (2000) generates a slightly larger estimate of 0.35 and a standard error
of 0.04. We also try the lagged-variables approach suggested by Card (2001). Instrumenting CA for each
PUMA with past CA levels based on the 1990 and 2000 Censuses produces similar results.
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groups raises the probability of Medicaid coverage for immigrants. Consistent with the
literature, we adopt as our baseline specification the OLS model; this estimate is the most
conservative estimate of network effect and can be considered the lower bound of the true
effect (Bertrand et al., 2000).
Although we can easily compare various specifications of our model by the relative mag-
nitude of network effect coefficient α , the interpretation of α itself is not straightforward.
We repeat the thought experiment presented in Bertrand et al. (2000). Imagine a policy
shock that directly increases Medicaid participation by some amount λ . Mathematically,
this effect is expressed in the model as:
Medicaidi jk = λ +CA jk×Medicaidkα+Xi jkβ +CA jkθ + γ j +δk + εi jk. (1.4)
In this formulation, a 1 percentage point increase in λ would increase Medicaid enrollment
by 1 percentage point if networks had no effect on participation. However, an increase in λ
generates an additional indirect effect through the increase in Medicaidk. After taking the
average with respect to k on both sides we can solve for the overall increase in Medicaid
participation and Medicaidk and identify the network effect by differentiating with respect
to λ .
Formally:
dMedicaidk
dλ
= 1+αCA jk× dMedicaidkdλ (1.5)
A policy that boosts Medicaid enrollment by 1 percentage point directly would increase
enrollment in language group k by 1
1−αCAk percentage points when the multiplier effect is
taken into consideration. We plug in the coefficient α from our baseline OLS specification
and take the mean of that expression weighted by language group size, we find that PUMA-
level linguistic networks generate a marginal increase of 26 percent. In Table 1.4 we show
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Table 1.4: Changing the Control Variables
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Medicaid Enrollment
CA×Medicaid 0.176*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.183*** 0.186***
(0.034) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
PUMA F.E. NO YES YES YES YES
Language group F.E. YES YES YES YES YES
Year F.E. YES YES YES YES YES
Exogenous controls NO NO YES YES YES
Exogenous controls and education NO NO NO YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.131 0.153 0.155 0.180
Observations 118,803 118,803 118,803 118,803 118,803
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Data source: 2008 and 2009 American Community Survey. The sample is the same as in the baseline specification (Column 1
of Table 1.3). Standard errors are clustered at the PUMA level.
the estimate is not sensitive to our choice of covariates.
1.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, we discuss the sensitivity of our results to other specifications. We test other
batteries of control variables, strengthen our criteria for Medicaid eligibility, and run the
model on subsets of the data based on sex and language. Our results are robust to these
tweaks of our model. We also find network effects when using a specification that uses
exante group characteristics to proxy for “welfare culture” and when controlling for the
availability of Medicaid resources in foreign-languages, which has a positive impact on
participation.
In Table 1.4 we test the sensitivity of our estimates to different sets of control variables.
Adding and removing these exogenous control variables (e.g., age, gender, and race), as
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well as others that are more likely endogenous (marital status or family size), does not
substantially affect the coefficient. Our baseline specification uses a linear probability
model, and we obtain similar results using probit estimation (see Table 1.11, Column 3).
Our results are also robust to different definitions of contact availability. For example,
instead of using CA as our measure for people speaking language k in area j, we replaced
it with the simple logarithm ln(C jkt) and with the logarithm of the local share speaking that
language, ln(C jktA jt ), without normalizing by the national level (see Table 1.11, Columns 1
and 2, at the end of this chapter).
1.5.1 Restricting the Sample by Age, Sex, and Language
We next investigate how the network effect varies for subsets of our sample. Because more
than three-quarters are Spanish speakers, we verify our results are not driven solely by this
group. Only 22% of Spanish speakers have private insurance, a proportion much lower
than that of the other language groups. By comparison, the rate of private insurance is 46%
among English speakers and around 60% for speakers of Japanese, German, Greek and
Hebrew (Table 1.2). Running the same set of regressions from the previous sections but
excluding Spanish language groups, we obtain a coefficient of 0.16, which is significant
and similar to our estimate for the overall sample.
One might also be concerned that variation in our measure of CA might reflect not
the density of immigrants but the size of their households. We address this issue with
specifications using households, rather than individuals, as the unit of analysis. To ensure
that each household is represented only once in the data, we eliminate all men and retain
only one woman per household. Because Medicaid rules are more generous toward women
in their childbearing years, we also try isolating various age groups. When we bring down
the upper bound on age to 55 or 45 years old, instead of 64 years old, the effect is still
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Table 1.5: Robustness Checks: Sub-Samples by Sociodemographic Characteristics
CA×Medicaid Sample size
Panel A: By Demographic Characteristics
Overall sample 0.186*** 118,803
(0.027)
Non-Spanish speakers 0.164*** 35,063
(0.029)
Men 0.192*** 55,344
(0.033)
Women 0.186*** 63,459
(0.032)
Women< 55 0.207*** 54,662
(0.036)
Women≤ 45 0.195*** 42,254
(0.042)
Women≤ 35 0.106** 23,839
(0.054)
Women w/children in household 0.241*** 50,959
(0.047)
Panel B: By Percentage of Federal Poverty Line
Below 150% FPL 0.185*** 83,175
(0.033)
Below 100% FPL 0.152*** 47,073
(0.043)
Below 50% FPL 0.137*** 18,401
(0.055)
Panel C: By Fluency and Second-Generation Immigrants
Non-Fluent 0.188*** 59,765
(0.045)
Fluent 0.139*** 59,038
(0.029)
U.S.-born speaking a language other than English at home 0.069* 31,189
(0.004)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Data source: 2008 and 2009 American Community Survey. Each line represents a separate regression with Medicaid enrollment
as the dependent variable. The control variables are the same as in the baseline specification (Column 1 of Table 1.3). The sample is
the same as baseline, plus additional restriction(s) as indicated. Our dummy variable for fluency equals 1 for individuals who report
speaking English “well” or “very well.” Standard errors are clustered at the PUMA level.
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strong and significant. However, when we limit the sample to the 19-35 age group, the
sample size is greatly reduced and the network effect becomes weaker and loses statistical
significance. We also find the network effect is slightly smaller among women than among
men, although though not statistically different (Table 1.5, Panel A). The difference could
be explained by the fact that women have a wider variety of opportunities to learn about
Medicaid from out-of-network sources, while men are more dependent upon acquaintances
for knowledge of the program. States target women in outreach campaigns, and Medicaid
and CHIP advertisements tend to feature women and children rather than male parents
(Perry et al., 2000).
One criticism of our analysis might be that the sample is overly broad. We consider
“potentially Medicaid-eligible” all immigrants with family incomes below the 200% of
the FPL. Ideally, we would want to use a sample of only those actually eligible for the
program, but we cannot observe all the conditions necessary to impute Medicaid eligibility
in the ACS data. While we do not have the information needed to determine eligibility for
Medicaid exactly, we can further restrict our sample to low-income individuals (see Table
1.5, Panel B).17 Network effects remain present when we focus on individuals below 150%,
100%, and 50% of the FPL.
When we do attempt to impute eligibility, the results are inconsistent with the ACS
data. While the main criterion for Medicaid eligibility is income, eligibility also depends on
sex, age, disability status, pregnancy, and assets. Further complicating matters, most states
provide Medicaid or SCHIP coverage beyond the federal minimum requirements. We take
the 2009 state-level Medicaid criteria as summarized by the Kaiser Family Foundation (Ross
17In the entire 2008-2009 ACS, half of individuals covered by Medicaid are above the 115% of the
FPL, while 25% are above the 206% of the FPL. We also try limiting our sample to those not covered by
private insurance (i.e., who report having Medicaid or being uninsured), but this does not affect our results
substantially. We still find positive and significant results for samples with 150% and 100% FPL cutoffs. The
sample shrinks considerably and we lose power, however, when looking at individuals below 50% of the FPL
who lack private insurance.
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Table 1.6: Robustness Checks: Years in U.S., Citizenship, and English Fluency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CA×Medicaid 0.186*** 0.274*** 0.241*** 0.315*** 0.374***
(0.027) (0.033) (0.029) (0.030) (0.094)
CA×Medicaid×years in U.S. -0.006***
(0.001)
CA×Medicaid×U.S. citizen -0.118***
(0.027)
CA×Medicaid×English fluency -0.235***
(0.021)
CA×Medicaid× -0.274**
local avg. English fluency of language group (0.112)
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.190 0.189 0.191 0.189
Observations 118,803 118,803 118,803 118,803 118,803
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Data Source: 2008 and 2009 American Community Survey. The sample and control variables are the same as in the baseline
specification (Column 1 of Table 1.3). Our dummy variable for fluency equals 1 for individuals who report speaking English “well” or
“very well.” Standard errors are clustered at the PUMA level.
and Horn, 2008) and apply those to the ACS respondents’ information on state of residence,
age, family size, income, and sex. The imputed eligibility differs greatly from self-reported
Medicaid participation; almost half the individuals who reported Medicaid coverage are
deemed not eligible by our imputation. Despite this inconsistency, characteristics of self-
reported Medicaid recipients in our sample do generally match demographic characteristics
of the actual Medicaid population. For example, we can use the ACS to confirm that
enrollment rates in Medicaid are lower among immigrants. In Massachusetts, which has
relatively liberal eligibility rules, we find that 38% of potentially eligible immigrants in our
sample report having no insurance in 2008, compared with 28% of native-born residents.
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1.5.2 Citizenship, Language Fluency, and Length of Residence
Based upon our main hypothesis that network effects reduce informational costs, we expect
networks to be more influential for people of limited English proficiency or who arrived
in the United States more recently. In general, we examine the effect on our results from
altering the model in two ways: by changing the sample of individuals i and by changing
our definition of CA. When we restrict our sample to the English-proficient, the network
effect is weaker than for the whole sample. Effects are smaller among the U.S.-born who
speak a language other than English at home (see Table 1.5, Panel C).18 If networks affect
insurance choices by reducing language barriers and facilitating access to information, then
it makes sense that those with the weakest English skills would benefit most from exposure
to speakers of their native language.
We also tested a specification that takes into account individuals’ degree of assimilation.
We test additional network interaction terms that include the length of residency in United
States, U.S. citizenship, and a dummy for English fluency (equal to 1 for those who report
speaking English “well” or “very well” and 0 otherwise). We also test the influence of
average English proficiency of the local network (Table 1.6). The network effects appear
weaker for for fluent speakers, older cohorts of immigrants, and for U.S. citizens. The
average English fluency of the network also reduces the network’s effect. These results
are consistent with the idea that the information advantage implied by network availability
becomes less relevant for those who have been in the U.S. longer or who have greater skill
in understanding English.
18If we restrict the CA definition to consider only the U.S.-born as members of the network, the network
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Due to the limitations of the ACS questionnaire, we are not
able to identify as immigrant descendants those who report speaking English at home. Additionally, we tested
our model using a sample of only U.S. citizens. This more restrictive sample produced a network effect that
is of the same sign and slightly smaller. The coefficient is 0.16 (standard error 0.04) for citizens, compared
with 0.21 (standard error 0.03) for non-citizens.
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Table 1.7: Foreign-Language Medicaid Information
Language Number of States
Spanish 30
Vietnamese 7
Russian 6
Hmong 5
Chinese 4
Korean 3
Cambodian/Mon-Khmer 2
Somali 2
Lao 2
Creole 1
Arabic 1
Farsi 1
Tagalog 1
Japanese 1
Armenian 1
French 1
German 1
Tigrigna 1
Burmese 1
Ukranian 1
Other languages in the sample 0
Notes: Websites were checked on November 30, 2010. States are counted as having online Medicaid information if the state Medicaid
site has either a web page or a downloadable application form or pamphlet in that language.
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1.5.3 Availability of Medicaid Information in Other Languages
An alternative explanation for the phenomenon that we attribute to language networks would
be that government authorities respond to immigrant populations with outreach campaigns.
A simple and relatively low-cost policy solution to narrowing the participation gap between
immigrants and natives is to create multilingual information campaigns. States can improve
awareness of Medicaid by providing radio advertisements, billboards, posters, or pamphlets
in the languages of their local immigrant communities. Aizer (2007) used data from
California, which launched an advertising campaign and hired community-based assistants
to facilitate the Medicaid-application process, to show that outreach efforts explain 55%
of the increase in Medicaid enrollment between 1997 and 2000. These increases were
concentrated among Hispanics and Asians.
Imagine a state that decides it will provide Medicaid information in a foreign lan-
guage, but only if some critical mass of immigrants either resides there or is potentially
eligible for Medicaid. As a result, it would appear in the data that immigrants in high-
concentration states would be more likely to receive Medicaid, even though the mechanism
is not information-sharing but a “bureaucratic channel” (Bertrand et al., 2000). We do
not, however, think this story about bureaucracy completely describes our findings. Our
model uses PUMA fixed effects, which will pick up any state-level differences in policy.
Moreover, not all immigrant waves have historically been drawn to the same cities or states.
We search for a possible bureaucratic response as distinct from the language network
effect. While we have no way of measuring the volume of state-provided information, we do
want to capture the availability of Medicaid information to non-English speakers. In some
states, Medicaid agencies provide on their websites enrollment information and application
forms in languages other than English. Although websites with English-language portals
may not be the primary source of information for immigrants with limited language
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proficiency, our rationale is that the availability of Internet-based materials is correlated
with the overall availability of foreign-language materials. Given that a state has already
created a form or pamphlet in, for example, Vietnamese, the marginal cost of placing that
resource online is negligible. Web links are also a convenient medium for passing on
information to another person.
We visit each state’s Medicaid website to check whether it includes either an application
form or an informational page in a language other than English (see Table 1.7).19 The
vast majority of states do not provide any information in a language other than English or
Spanish. A total of 30 states provide some sort of Spanish-language information, while
9 states have material in Vietnamese, the next most common language. Multilingual
outliers are Washington state (12 languages besides English), California (10) and Kansas
(9). In Table 1.8, we modify our baseline specification to control for the effect of having
information in one’s own language. We find a positive and significant coefficient for
the effect of Internet-based information. We then interact the network measure with the
own-language information dummy and find a positive effect.
In general, immigrants whose state provides Internet resources in their native tongue
are more likely to enroll in Medicaid. While the results of our website survey may not be
sufficient to disentangle the mechanism underlying the network effect, they do suggest that
publishing information in the languages of the immigrant community might have positive
effects on participation both directly and through the network’s multiplier effect.
1.5.4 Contact Availability Based on Country of Origin
While a common language makes communication easier, immigrants may associate with
people who speak their language because they also share cultural norms. For example,
19All websites were visited on November 30, 2010.
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Table 1.8: Availability of Foreign-Language Medicaid Information Online
(1) (2) (3)
CA×Medicaid 0.186*** 0.184*** 0.152***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030)
website in own language 0.020** 0.018*
(0.009) (0.009)
CA×Medicaid× 0.086**
website in own language (0.042)
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.189 0.189
Observations 118,803 118,803 118,803
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Data source: 2008 and 2009 American Community Survey. The sample and control variables are the same as in the baseline
specification (Column 1 of Table 1.3). Standard errors are clustered at the PUMA level. We checked each state’s Medicaid website in
December 2010. A state is counted as having foreign-language information if its website contains a page or a downloadable pamphlet
or application in a language other than English.
perhaps what matters for the Senegalese is not the local presence of other francophones
but of other people from Senegal. In the case of Medicaid, relevant cultural norms include
attitudes toward the welfare state and stigma related to government handouts. In times of
need, immigrants from some cultures may be more inclined to turn to friends or family,
rather than to the state.
We cannot definitively determine the importance of language-based networks relative
to cultural networks, but we can test a model with a different network. We use data from
the same 2008-09 ACS to create “ethnic” networks that are instead defined by country of
origin. We exclude from the ACS all immigrants whose native countries are represented by
fewer than 50 observations in our final sample and those from countries where English is
spoken by a majority of the population.20
20We take our list of majority-English countries from the United Kingdom Border Agency’s regulations for
non-European Union migrants exempt from language examinations and add to it the U.K. and Ireland. The
list is available at http://www.ukvisas.gov.uk/en/aboutus/features/englishlanguagetestforpartners.
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Our econometric specification remains the same as our main model, except we define
contact availability using country of origin instead of language spoken at home, and we re-
place language fixed effects with country-of-origin fixed effects.21 With these modifications,
shown in Columns 1-3 of Table 1.9, the network effects are still positive and significant.
Because our baseline results use language-based networks, we cannot directly compare the
coefficient to the country-of-origin findings, but the effect is of a similar magnitude. A 1
percentage point direct increase in enrollment would raise participation within the average
country-of-origin group by a total 1.22 percentage points.
If the network effect were driven by bureaucratic response alone we would not see
any marginal effect when we consider country-of-origin within a given language group
because most policies are implemented on the basis of linguistic differences and not ethnic
differences. In Column 2, we show that country-based network effects exist when we
limit the analysis to Spanish speakers. This result suggests that the network effect is some
combination of information and culture within the language groups.
1.5.5 Identification by Ex Ante Characteristics
Another solution to the reflection problem, besides the instrumental variable used in
Bertrand et al. (2000) and Evans et al. (1992), is to use ex ante peer characteristics (Angrist
and Pischke, 2008). In our case, this means using past Medicaid enrollment levels as a
proxy for “Medicaid culture” (Bertrand et al., 2000). While past Medicaid enrollment
will capture information about cultural attitudes toward public assistance, it should be
uncorrelated with shocks specific to group behavior in 2008-09.
While exante peer characteristics from past ACS data would be ideal, the ACS began
recording health-insurance status only in 2008. The Current Population Survey asked about
21Our results here are not sensitive to our choice of fixed effects.
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health insurance beginning in 1994. We use the CPS numbers on past average enrollment,
Medicaidk1994, to capture the culture of each country-based network k. The 1994 CPS
is a suitable proxy because it is recent enough to be correlated with 2008-09 enrollment
numbers yet old enough to be pre-welfare reform and uncorrelated with unobservable
contemporary shocks.22
We find that the network effect with the past-Medicaid proxy is positive and significant
both among all immigrants and within the Spanish-speaking population, while there is no
significant effect when we restrict the sample to languages other than Spanish (Table 1.9,
Columns 4-6).
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide fresh evidence that network effects contribute to disparities in
Medicaid enrollment among immigrants. The American Community Survey allows us
to investigate the role of ethnic networks across a broad population and to verify that
network effects exist for insurance and not just for assistance programs that provide
immediate, tangible benefits. With modifications to the instrumental variables strategy from
Bertrand et al. (2000), we control for the effects of potential differential selection while
also addressing the reflection problem.
We find that language networks are most influential for those who are less likely to
obtain Medicaid information from sources outside the network. Alternate specifications
in our sensitivity analysis support the hypothesis that the network effect within an ethnic
group comes from information-sharing. This finding is supported by the fact that we find
smaller language-network effects among second-generation immigrants and those fluent in
English.
22The correlation between ethnic groups’ 2008-09 Medicaid enrollment and the 1994 level is 0.44.
30
Our results suggest that future policies to expand Medicaid enrollment among immi-
grants will have a larger marginal effect for groups with stronger networks and higher
contact availability. At the same time, variation in network density and cultural differences
also represent a source of disparities in insurance coverage among immigrants. As migra-
tion patterns change (Massey, 2008) and as new waves of immigrants increasingly locate in
states that do not provide Medicaid to newcomers and that have not historically been major
immigrant destinations, these disparities could worsen.
Encouragingly, we find that states’ efforts to provide multilingual Medicaid information
are associated with greater participation. We believe further efforts to reduce language
barriers, clarify eligibility criteria, and streamline the application process will be needed if
policy-makers’ goal is to minimize the number of people who remain uninsured. While
prioritizing outreach toward large immigrant enclaves may be the most obvious policy
initiative, the multiplier effect we detect among communities of shared language suggests
that people from small, relatively dispersed ethnicities may be at the greatest risk for being
uninsured yet Medicaid-eligible.
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Table 1.10: Summary Results for First-Stage Regression
Instrumented Variables: CA CA×Medicaid
First-stage F (2, 1218) 485.00 152.05
Angrist-Pischke F (1, 1218) 969.99 298.44
Shea’s R2 0.24 0.32
Angrist-Pischke R2 0.23 0.31
Notes: Data Source: 2008 and 2009 American Community Survey. These are the first-stage summary statistics for the IV estimate
reported in Table 3.
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Table 1.11: Alternative Measures of Network Density and Probit Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
Network Measure OLS OLS Probit
log(C jkt)×Medicaidkt 0.197***
(0.026)
log(C jktA jt )×Medicaidkt 0.151***
(0.024)
CA jkt ×Medicaidkt 0.280**
(0.121)
PUMA F.E. YES YES NO
Language group F.E. YES YES YES
Year F.E. YES YES YES
Observations 118,803 118,803 118,803
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Data Source: 2008 and 2009 American Community Survey. The sample and control variables are the same as in the baseline
specification (Column 1 of Table 1.3). Standard errors are clustered at the PUMA level.
Chapter 2
Who Are the Consumers of Consumer-Driven Health Plans? Evidence from the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program
2.1 Introduction
Health insurance exchanges are a central feature of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act. While exchanges hold promise as a mechanism for pooling risk and creating
affordable options for the uninsured, policy-makers designing exchanges must confront one
of the fundamental problems in the economics of health insurance: the trade-off between
adverse selection and the breadth of choice.
The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program is the oldest health insurance exchange
in the U.S. and was a model for exchanges under the ACA. Through the FEHBP, run by the
U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), federal workers can purchase subsidized
health insurance, vision and dental coverage, and life insurance. Each year, over 2 million
federal workers and their families are insured in commercial plans that participate the
FEHBP. The FEHBP currently offers more than 200 different health plans of various types.
In this paper I study the period around the policy change in U.S. law and FEHBP rules
that allowed so-called consumer-directed or consumer-driven health plans (CDHPs) to
participate in the system. Until 2004, employees were offered only more traditional forms
of insurance: fee-for-service (FFS), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and health
maintenance organizations (HMOs). With higher deductibles than traditional plans, CDHPs
are thought to attract younger, healthier consumers. In a setting where multiple plan types
are available, a diversity of plan types can drive adverse selection. Using data on the
FEHBP, I seek to answer two questions. First, are CDHPs attracting a disproportionately
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younger and healthier pool of enrollees? Second, did the entry of consumer-driven health
plans generate enough adverse selection to affect the premiums offered by HMOs?
I will refer to both the consumer-driven health plans introduced in 2004 and the high-
deductible health plans that began in 2005 as CDHPs. Relative to FFS or HMOs—which
for the sake of brevity I will refer to as “traditional plans”—the distinguishing feature
of both HDHPS and CDHPs is a higher deductible as well as a designated account to
cover out-of-pocket health expenditures. I compare geographically distinct markets where
CDHPs are present to those with none in order to study how CDHP entry affects existing
HMOs and whether their introduction exacerbated adverse selection.
The FEHBP is an open marketplace in which any plan meeting OPM’s standards can
participate.1 OPM does not impose any minimum or maximum number of plans, nor does
it actively solicit contracts. As a result, some employees do not have any choices outside
the nationally offered FFS and CDHP plans, especially those living in rural areas (McBride
et al., 2003).
OPM does not engage in price-setting or cost containment. What OPM refers to as the
negotiation process with carriers is more like a review rather than bargaining or competitive
bidding. OPM actuaries verify that plans premiums are set in an actuarially fair manner but
do not haggle over plan benefits or lower pricing. Each January, OPM publishes a “call
letter” that suggests modification to plan contracts. Past call letters have outlined a variety
of goals, from addressing childhood obesity to encouraging doctors to prescribe generic
versions of prescription drugs. While plans are required to discuss in their contracts how
they plan to address the call letter goals, implementing those suggestions or fulfilling the
call letter outcomes is not necessary for participation in the FEHBP.
While OPM and other government agencies handle contracting with health plans and
1In contrast, exchanges such as the Massachusetts Connector use a competitive bidding process.
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Table 2.1: Number of FEHBP Plans by Type
Year CDHP HDHP HMO FFS Total
2001 0 0 244 14 258
2002 0 0 180 16 194
2003 1 0 167 18 185
2004 17 0 169 17 203
2005 23 20 189 16 248
2006 34 26 204 16 280
2007 33 28 209 14 284
2008 32 31 206 14 283
2009 28 27 201 13 269
2010 23 21 177 14 235
2011 12 17 164 14 207
TOTAL 202 170 2110 166 2648
Notes: The total row at the bottom of the table represents the total number of unique plan code/year combinations.
arrange premium payments, the plans bear all health expenditure risk. To participate in
the FEHBP, carriers must show that they are capable of bearing the risk of their federal
employee pool, which effectively means that federal employee plans represent at most a
small share of the carrier’s business.
2.2 The Medicare Modernization Act and High-Deductible Plans
CDHPs are a relatively recent phenomenon. They are distinguished by higher deductibles
compared with those of managed care or indemnity plans. The name implies that below
the deductible, consumers make health care decisions free from the distorting influence
of traditional co-payments or coinsurance. CDHPs enjoyed a boost in popularity due to
two factors in the early 2000’s. First, they were a response to dissatisfaction with managed
care. The higher deductible makes the consumer the source of rationing and cost control,
rather than employing an HMO or provider as a gatekeeper. The rationale is that consumers
who face the full marginal cost of care will more greatly limit their use of health care
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services, as did participants in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Newhouse, 1993).
Second, high deductible plans are entwined with the concept of tax-exempt medical savings
accounts. Specifically, CDHPs and HDHPs complement health savings accounts and
health reimbursement arrangements, accounts granted special tax status by the Medicare
Modernization Act in 2003.
Kay Coles James, director of OPM at the time CDHPs were made available to federal
workers, said during her announcement of the change, “We are putting a new focus on
personal responsibility and expanding the consumer’s role in driving both quality and
affordability.” OPM’s news release said that James also cited FEHBP’s history of innovation
and competition, and “she added that these characteristics of the FEHB Program dovetail
with President Bush’s belief that government should not attempt to centralize or control the
delivery of medicine, but should leave such decisions to patients and their doctors.”
The FEHBP taxonomy of health plans includes two sub-types in the consumer-driven
category; I will refer to what OPM calls “consumer-driven health plans” and “high-
deductible health plans” as consumer-driven. There is a technical and legal difference
between CDHPs and HDHPs; however, the distinguishing feature that both share in contrast
to traditional health plan types is the high deductible designed to make the consumer the
driving force for cost control. The Internal Revenue Service defines high-deductible health
plans as those with deductibles above a certain threshold. Only people with HDHPs meeting
the IRS criteria are allowed to place pre-tax dollars into a health savings account (HSA).
For 2010, the qualifying amounts for self-only coverage is a minimum $1,200 deductible
and a maximum out-of-pocket expenses of $5,950 ($2,400 and $11,900, respectively, for
family coverage). 2 FEHBP consumer-driven plans with deductibles below IRS threshold
provide a less-flexible health reimbursement arrangement (HRA), which is administered by
2For details, see Internal Revenue Service Publication 969 (cat. no. 24216S), Health Savings Accounts
and Other Tax-Favored Plans, 2010.
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the plan and cannot be transferred across plans.
In a setting where consumers have a choice of plans, the conventional wisdom is
CDHPs lure young, healthy people who expect to have low health care expenditures.
Such consumers would benefit from having a lower premium yet still be protected from
catastrophic loss. Consumer surveys confirm that CDHPs’ chief attraction is low premiums
(Buntin et al., 2006). In the Massachusetts insurance exchange, the Health Connector, the
highest-deductible plans fall into the “bronze” metal tier, the category suggested for people
who “don’t expect to need a lot of medical services.”3 In the literature, however, there is
mixed evidence on whom CDHPs attract and how they perform (Buntin et al., 2006). Ma
(2008) uses a theoretical model to study whether adverse selection occurs in a market where
firms offer both CDHP and traditional, lower-deductible plans. He shows that CDHPs could
attract low-cost consumers due to the low premium but may also attract high-cost types
due to generous reimbursement available once the deductible is reached. The nature of the
selection driven by a CDHP will depend upon the deductible as well as the cost-sharing
structure. CDHPs could cause greater fragmentation of risk types.
Recent studies have looked at how CDHP options affect plan selection, health care uti-
lization, and health outcomes. A large body of work concerns the University of Minnesota,
which first offered its employees a consumer-driven option in 2002 and later converted to
exclusively CDHPs (Parente et al., 2004, 2008). In the first years after the introduction,
when employees had a choice among two CDHPs and four other plans, they did not find
any evidence that those who chose CDHPs were younger or healthier. The authors also
studied the evolution of health spending as the university phased out the other plans, rolling
all its employees into CDHPs in 1998.
Parente et al. (2011) studied the employees of four large employers and found that
3See www.mahealthconnector.org.
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full replacement of traditional plans with CDHP resulted in cost savings. In the two firms
where costs increased, the authors stated that the rise in expenditures might be due to
the general increase in health care costs. They also found, however, that the new plans
discouraged preventive care, even when it was fully reimbursed and exempt from the
deductible. Similarly, Fronstin (2010) finds that 57% of CDHP enrollees believe that
their deductible applies to preventive care, even though most plans cover it in full. Other
research find CDHPs do appear to have a mixed effect on the volume of care consumed.
Preliminary evidence shows that CDHP enrollees have fewer visits to the emergency
department, especially for low-severity conditions (Wharam et al., 2007), although it may
be that the population also cut back on appropriate visits (Grudzen and Brook, 2007).
In a survey of the literature on CDHPs, Fronstin (2010) finds that in 2009 about
15% of employers offered at least one CDHP option and that 11% of individuals with
private insurance have CDHPs. Large firms are more likely to offer CDHPs, commonly
as one choice among various plan types. The insurers UnitedHealthCare, Aetna and
Cigna independently all have released studies comparing expenditures of CDHP enrollees
versus those of enrollees in traditional plans, finding conflicting evidence on how high-
deductible plans influence expenditures and cost growth. Unlike the University of Minnesota
experience, in which all health plans were replaced by new products at the same time a
CDHP option was introduced, the FEHBP added CDHPs and HDHPs to the existing menu
of choices. In the majority of states, Aetna’s CDHP and HDHP are the only options.
The Federal Employees Health Benefit Program was established in 1960. From the
very start, the program was intended to give employees choice among health plans (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2002). Today, the FEHBP offers a multitude of options,
from major national companies such as Aetna to local HMO networks. Employees can
choose among fee-for-service, consumer-directed health plans, and health maintenance
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organizations. All the FFS plans, many of which are preferred-provider organizations
(PPOs), are available nationwide. HMOs by design are built upon provider networks;
therefore, HMOs are available only in certain regions. Most HMO plans are available only
within a state or part of a state.
2.3 Introduction of CDHPs into the FEHB
The first consumer-driven product in the FEHBP was offered in 2003 by the American
Postal Workers’ Union (APWU). It was open to all federal employees nationwide, with a
small fee for non-union members.4 The APWU premium was $79 for individual and $187
for a family, slightly more than the premiums for the popular Blue Cross Blue Shield basic
benefit plan ($76 and $178, respectively). For low-spending employees, CDHPs may be
even more wallet-friendly than the premiums suggest since CDHP enrollees benefit from
“premium pass-though.” Since a CDHP enrollee is eligible for an HRA or HSA, the plan
deposits a portion, typically about two-thirds, of the premium into an account that can be
used to pay out-of-pocket health costs, including anything not covered under the deductible.
As of 2012, CDHPs had become available to FEHBP workers in 43 states, in addition
to the nationwide consumer-driven plans that are offered by employee unions but open
to all workers. CDHPs capture only a small share of FEHBP enrollment, however. At
the state level, CDHP participation ranges from a low of 1.1% in Alabama to a high of
7.5% in Colorado. CDHPs represent only a small share of the U.S. market for health plans
in general. The Truven MarketScan Research Database shows that only 1 percent of the
commercially insured population were in an CDHP in 2006.
Some OPM officials never expected high CDHP participation. The government ex-
pressed mixed messages for federal employees in its promotion of CDHPs at the time
4At the time, the APWU charged non-union federal employees a $5 membership fee for the first year, and
$35 for subsequent years. This was a small fee relative to the monthly premium.
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of the roll-out. Bush administration officials touted the new health savings accounts as
empowering consumers and as potentially cost-saving. At the same time, however, OPM
doubted that the plans were attractive enough to induce migration away from existing,
traditional plans.5 CDHPs are subsidized under the same formula as all other plans, and
OPM has never provided any extra incentive to promote switching into CDHPs.
CDHPs appear to offer opportunities for employees to save some money on premiums,
especially those who do not expect to to visit care providers or use only the fully covered
preventive services. In 2012, the three CDHPs available nationwide offered premiums
for which the employee share was priced at $89, $100, and $116 per month. The most
popular nationwide FFS option, the BlueCross BlueShield Service Benefit Plan, offered
standard-level coverage for $128 per month. Average premium prices by plan type are
shown in Table 2.2.
One stumbling block for consumers may be confusion about the cost structure of
CDHPs. Studies showing that enrollees misunderstood preventive care cost-sharing also
suggest that consumer education would be important for boosting the appeal of CDHPs.
Even for the FEHBP, a setting where enrollees are relatively well-educated and are provided
with standardized informational tools for comparing plan costs and features, employees
surveyed said they did not understand the reimbursement policy for a CDHP (U.S. Gov-
ernment Accountability Office, 2006). Premium pass-through means that comparison
shopping on the premium alone may cause consumers to underestimate the value of CDHPs.
Additionally, because of the government’s subsidy formula, consumers receive little of the
cost savings from plans with below-average premiums.
A 2005 Government Accountability Office report noted early indications of adverse
5For example, see David McGlinchey’s April 5, 2004, article for the magazine GovernmentExecutive,
”Feds promote new health accounts, but think workers will stay away.” (Available online:
http://www.govexec.com/pay-benefits/2004/04/feds-promote-new-health-accounts-but-think-workers-
will-stay-away/16378/)
42
Table 2.2: Average Monthly Premiums by Plan Type
Self-Only Plans
Year CDHP st. dev. HDHP st. dev. FFS st. dev. HMO st. dev.
2001 175.91 33.69 92.55 2.07
2002 160.94 24.17 102.23 2.93
2003 159.28 21.82 110.59 3.48
2004 71.43 2.46 173.64 24.29 116.89 3.14
2005 72.50 2.55 103.26 4.90 185.44 26.55 124.57 3.62
2006 76.15 2.05 104.05 6.19 193.15 29.77 132.37 3.83
2007 81.74 1.44 103.19 6.17 165.87 23.86 142.55 4.28
2008 84.74 1.54 110.74 7.14 135.93 15.48 149.02 4.65
2009 92.14 1.85 97.61 3.64 131.16 17.41 148.53 4.36
2010 100.52 1.76 97.22 4.60 137.08 12.82 146.85 4.90
2011 112.43 3.42 97.50 4.10 147.00 14.55 158.92 5.66
Self and Family Plans
Year CDHP st. dev. HDHP st. dev. FFS st. dev. HMO st. dev.
2001 367.61 70.56 259.04 6.38
2002 338.37 49.81 284.49 8.95
2003 343.05 43.95 307.55 9.94
2004 165.87 6.51 373.35 48.62 313.78 9.65
2005 166.89 5.95 240.99 9.60 394.93 52.29 323.99 9.64
2006 174.89 4.59 236.85 10.68 415.10 59.65 346.78 10.86
2007 187.76 3.26 236.46 12.66 357.53 46.68 373.15 11.29
2008 194.67 3.53 260.81 17.08 299.31 33.69 385.34 12.10
2009 211.47 4.27 221.75 7.19 295.89 40.63 384.77 12.21
2010 226.66 4.14 220.43 10.38 311.62 31.58 380.66 13.99
2011 254.51 8.34 222.46 9.85 349.18 37.76 405.70 14.28
Notes: Data source: OPM Central Personnel Data File. The premiums in this table are the portion paid by the employee. Unweighted
means are over all plans in OPM’s open season booklet. All premiums are expressed in real 2011 dollars.
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selection. It found that enrollees of the APWU consumer-driven plan generally appeared
healthier than the general employee population. In an appendix to the GAO report, OPM
said that “it would continue to monitor enrollment trends in the FEHBP and take appropriate
action to eliminate or minimize any adverse effects” (U.S. Government Accountability
Office, 2005), but there has been no follow-up report on the topic from GAO or OPM.
Although both the GAO report and data from the health insurance industry generally shows
that CDHPs attract healthier consumers, there has been little discussion within OPM about
whether CDHPs should continue to be offered in FEHBP. Since few federal employees
have enrolled, any adverse selection has been too slight to have detrimental effects on the
overall program. Aside from the 2004 GAO report, the government has not published any
analysis of adverse selection due to CDHPs.
In theory, adverse selection could be particularly acute in the FEHBP setting, where
the annual “open season” for plan enrollment makes switching from one plan to another
reasonably costless. The open season period is well-publicized by the government and
insurers, and prior to open season agencies’ human resources offices distribute to employees
a booklet of available plan options. Employees can switch in any open season without any
penalty, including changing coverage from family to individual coverage.6 If a consumer’s
realized total out-of-pocket cost under a CDHP is high, he can switch to an HMO with
lower expected cost at the end of the year.
CDHPs potentially generate selection along two dimensions. First, there may be
selection along the dimension of health risk. A CDHP consumer bears the full marginal cost
of health care initially, and even after the deductible the reimbursement rate of CDHPs is
the same or less generous than that of HMOs. Second, CDHPs may attract less risk-averse
consumers, while those more risk averse prefer deductible-free HMOs. If people also differ
6Like most insurance programs, employees can also switch without penalty during the year if they
experience a “qualifying life event”.
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in their attitudes toward health risk, as evidence suggests (Cutler et al., 2008), older and
more educated employees may more strongly prefer CDHPs if they have wealth that can
cushion them from health-related expenses. Since these two forces for selection act in
opposite directions along typical yardsticks for measuring selection—health status, age,
and income—the net effect may be no observable selection.
2.4 Data
The data I use comes from two sources. First, I have plan information created by coding
the contents of the OPM’s Open Season health plan brochures from the years 2001 to 2010,
resulting in 2,000 plan-year observations. The Guide to Federal Benefits for Federal Civilian
Employees (publication RI 70-1) is the brochure given to employees in paper format and
made available in digital format.7 Each observation includes a description of the plan
type (e.g., HMO), the premium, the deductible, detailed information about co-payments
and coinsurance, whether prescription drug discounts are available, the geographic area of
availability, and the results of consumer satisfaction surveys. Each health plan option is
assigned a unique three-digit code, the first two digits representing the plan and the third
denoting self-only versus family coverage. The plans retain their codes as long as they are
in the FEHBP system, which means I can link plans across time even if coverage areas,
benefit designs, or premiums change.
Second, I obtained 10 years of federal employee records from the OPM’s Central
Personnel Data File.8 The data I use for this study includes a total of about 1.5 million
employees per year, or about 15 million person-year observations. There are about 2.3
million unique employees, 34% of whom are employed by the government for all 10 years.
7In addition to making a PDF of the document available, OPM also provides a interactive plan-finder tool
on its website that details the plans available by location.
8I obtained the CPFD extract from the OPM after filing a Freedom of Information Act request.
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The CBSA is masked for security reasons for about 7.7 million of the employee-year
observations. The distributions of age and health plan choice of these “sensitive occupation”
employees are similar to that of the employees whose location is known.
The data are essentially a snapshot employees and their health care choices in September
of each of the year over the period 2001-2010. The variables available to me contain
information an employer would typically have on its employees, including pay grade,
geographic location, education level, disability status. I also have unique ID numbers for
each government agency and employee, which allows me to link records across years into a
panel. At present, OPM does not maintain utilization or claims data on federal employees.9
In this study, I consider only employees ages 21 to 64.10 In this age range, employees are
old enough to be off their parents’ insurance or university insurance and young enough that
Medicare is not their primary form of insurance. FEHBP plans are considered secondary
insurers for employees on Medicare.11
2.5 Consumers’ Plan Choices
OPM generally does not modify the FEHBP on its own initiative. Changes to the program,
including CDHPs, are usually the result of direction from the administration or the Congress
and such innovations tend to be politicized.12 Because the timing of the introduction of
CDHPs was determined by politics, rather than market conditions, I can use this event as a
“natural experiment” for understanding how new plans affect a competitive health insurance
9The ACA directs OPM to create a Health Claims Data Warehouse to be available to government and
external researchers who wish to study exchanges and managed competition (75 Federal Register 192, 5 Oct.
2010, p. 61532). While the warehouse was slated to begin in December 2011, complaints about privacy
concerns have delayed the project.
10Gruber and Washington (2005) also limit the sample to this age range in their study of the FEHBP.
11Interestingly, I do not find a sharp drop-off in the number of federal employees between ages 64 and 65.
12In an interview, Dean Schleicher of OPM said there was “no build-up” from OPM’s perspective to the
introduction of HDHPs, and that at any particular time the “flavor” of changes to the FEHBP and its plans
depends on the political agenda of the current Congress and administration.
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Table 2.3: Employee Characteristics by Health Plan Type, Year 2010
All Employees
HMO FFS CDHP
paygrade 10.420 *** 10.550 *** 10.421
2.980 2.921 2.980
age 46.246 *** 45.609 *** 42.471
10.325 10.811 10.913
Sex (=1 if male) 0.443 *** 0.519 *** 0.534
0.497 0.500 0.499
disabled (=1 if disability reported) 0.092 *** 0.091 *** 0.007
0.288 0.288 0.287
N 212294 746159 33942
Cohort Hired in 2010 Only
HMO FFS CDHP
paygrade 8.582 8.614 8.647
3.112 3.069 3.020
age 36.033 *** 36.678 *** 36.250
10.410 10.858 10.842
Sex (=1 if male) 0.484 *** 0.517 *** 0.569
0.500 0.500 0.499
disabled (=1 if disability reported) 0.086 * 0.088 * 0.082
0.290 0.287 0.285
N 8831 40830 3899
Notes: Data source: OPM Central Personnel Data File. General Schedule employees only. Stars indicate whether CDHP mean is
significantly different from HMO/FFS value (* 0.05, ** .01, *** 0.001)
market.
Based on a cross-section of all employees in the year 2010, CDHP enrollees do differ
from those who pick traditional plans. Compared with HMO enrollees and with FFS
enrollees, CDHP consumers are significantly younger, from higher pay grades, and more
likely to be male. CDHP enrollees are slightly less likely (P-value 0.06) to have a reported
disability. (See upper panel of Table 2.3.)
Because employees move up the pay grade scale based on education, merit-based
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promotion, and tenure, it might appear that the higher pay grade for CDHP consumers is at
odds with the fact that CDHPs enrollees are younger on average. However, employees with
higher incomes may be more tolerant of health-related income shocks and therefore willing
to take on more health expenditure risk. It may also be that more educated employees are
more likely to shop the full range of options available rather than sticking with the de facto
default plan, BlueCross and BlueShield Service Benefit Plan.
The difference in the enrollee profile between CDHPs and traditional plans could be
driven by two forces. First, employees hired after the introduction of CDHPs may be more
likely to consider that option, while previously hired cohorts are inclined to stay with the
more familiar HMOs or FFS plans. Second, newly hired employees are on average younger
than the existing pool of workers, and they may find CDHPs more attractive if they are
relatively healthier.
I find a clearer picture of the sources of selection by separating cohorts by hiring date.
Using just employees paid according to the General Schedule allows me to also look for
differences by pay grade. The General Schedule is a table of pay grades and is used
across agencies and nationwide. The only variation from the General Schedule are locality
adjustments—scalar multipliers applied to all pay grades and their intermediate steps ato
ccount for geographic differences in cost of living. Pay grades are determined by such
factors as education, experience, merit, and tenure, and I use grades in my analysis as a
proxy for income, conveniently adjusted for local purchasing power.
For example, looking at my oldest cohorts of employees, hired before 2005, there are
large differences between CDHP consumers and all others. Compared with HMO enrollees,
CDHPs attract a person who is 1.5 years younger, from a lower paygrade, and less likely to
be female or disabled. It appears that the apparent selection of healthier employees into
CDHPs is due at least as much to the inertia of older employees staying in older plans as to
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age-based differences in preferences among employees. If all employees were forced to
make active plan choices, the age-based selection would perhaps be less acute. As shown
in the lower panel of Table 2.3, demographic differences among CDHP and traditional plan
enrollees are much smaller and in many cases not significant among employees who started
in 2010.
These results are consistent with the findings of the 2005 GAO report on the first CDHP,
which was the APWU plan. The GAO found that according to surveys, enrollees of the
CDHP were more likely to be college educated and have greater self-reported health. There
was not much difference in the age of enrollees in the CDHP, compared to that of other
newly offered plans (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005).
In the FEHBP, CDHP participation has been driven by newly hired employees, rather
than switching by older workers. About 2% of workers hired in 2002 or earlier were
enrolled in CDHPs in 2010, compared with 6% percent for workers hired during the period
2008-2010. Though the number of federal employees in CDHPs remains small several
years after their introduction, the CDHPs’ market share may continue to grow if new cohorts
of employees give greater consideration to CDHPs when making their initial plan choices.
If current CDHP enrollees exhibit the same inertia as older cohorts of employees, however,
then the average age of the CDHP population could increase, preventing a large degree of
adverse selection. It is unclear what the net effect might be.
2.5.1 States as Markets
I use the emergence of CDHPs to test differences-in-differences, comparing plans across
markets before and after the 2004 FEHBP rule change. In other words, I think of HMOs
as receiving experimental “treatment” if they are in a market where at least one CDHP
entered.
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I first test whether HMO premiums responded to CDHP market share at the state level.
I take all HMOs available to consumers in the years 2004 to 2010 and consider what
happened to the HMO premiums. Because the defining characteristic of HMOs are strict
provider networks, most HMO plans have limited geographic reach—for example, serving
exclusively eastern North Dakota, greater Seattle area, or Washington, D.C. metro area.
For competition with HMOs, the relevant market would be a local, within-state region. By
contrast, if a CDHP is available in a state, FEHBP offers it for most or all areas of the state.
CDHPs, therefore, are competitors for all HMOs in a state.
I estimate for each HMO i in state j at time t:
log(premiumi jt) = α×CDshare jt +Xi jt ×β1 ++X jt ×β2 +δt + γi + ε (2.1)
where deltat and γi are dummies for year and plans, respectively. The variable
CDshare jt is the market share of CDHPs and HDHPs among employees working in state
j, so that α captures the within-plan effect of competing against CDHPs. Xit contains
plan-specific control variables, including copayments for prescription drugs, hospital stays
and office visits. The premium I use in the estimation is the total premium, which includes
both the employee and government shares, for a self-only plan.
The vector of plan characteristics Xi jt is a set of control variables, which can include
enrollee characteristics. I can use the personnel data to obtain information about the typical
enrollee of each health plan—such as the sex ratio, mean age, and education level. However,
an argument against including this information on the right-hand side is that changes in
demographic composition is one of the mechanisms by which adverse selection affects the
premium. If adverse selection is occurring, then the health expenditure risk represented
by a plan’s average enrollee will change as more plans enter. Some of this variation is
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potentially observable to me using basic demographic characteristics such as age and sex,
although I cannot observe actual health status or health risk. Absent data on health status or
claims, I rely on premiums as a proxy for the information on adverse selection.
The coefficient for CDHP share suggests that an additional percentage point of market
share for CDHPs results in a 1% to 7% increase in HMO premiums. However, the coefficient
is small and sensitive to the choice of covariates in the regression. The state market share
data may be too noisy for me to find any effect from the market share captured by CDHPs.
Table 2.7 and other regression results are at the end of this chapter.
2.5.2 CBSAs as Markets
After states, the next-smallest geographic unit available to me is what the Census calls
core-based statistical areas (CBSA), a catch-all for metropolitan and micropolitan statistical
areas. CBSAs encompass an urban area and surrounding environs from which one might
commute to the main urban center. CBSAs represent good approximations of markets in
this context, since they cross state borders and are an area within which a consumer could
be expected to travel for health care.
Since plan options are listed by state, rather than by CBSA, I devise a method for
determining which plans are viable options in each market. I first total up the number of
employees per plan in each CBSA for each year, using only employees enrolled in self-only
plans.13 I then establish a minimum enrollment for a plan to be considered in the market.
The primary benefit of defining CBSAs in this manner is that it should capture the
set of plans that are functionally available for local employees, which are a subset of
available plans listed in the open season brochure. For example, a plan listed as serving
13The booklet handed out to employees during open seasons lists plans by state. The interactive plan search
tool on OPM’s website allows employees to enter their postal ZIP Code in order to pull up a list of available
plans.
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Table 2.4: Number of Health Plans per CBSA Market
Year FFS HMO CDHP
2001 1.34 2.11 0.00
2002 3.63 2.26 0.00
2003 3.68 2.24 0.10
2004 3.85 2.22 0.26
2005 3.78 2.27 0.47
2006 3.73 2.33 0.60
2007 3.81 2.56 0.79
2008 4.02 2.59 1.01
2009 4.49 2.64 1.51
2010 4.75 2.57 1.68
Notes: Data Source: OPM Central Personnel Data File. Plans with self-only enrollment of 5 or more are counted as present in a CBSA
market.
statewide may not actually offer in-network health care providers in some areas. Rural
employees, in particular, may not have nearby in-network providers except through the
national fee-for-service plan (McBride et al., 2003). The drawback of this approach to
identifying markets and choice sets is that plans with no enrollment are categorized as
unavailable, rather than as having failed to gain any market share.
I set a minimum cutoff for number of enrollees to eliminate from my sample plan
choices that appear inconsistent with other employee information. For example, I observe
employees enrolled in plans offered only in faraway states, which may have to do with
relocation or detail assignment to an office far from the employee’s actual place of residence.
To eliminate these quirks, I consider plan as available in a CBSA in a given year only if I
observe at least 5 employees enrolled.
In contrast to the state-based-market model, in the CBSA-based market setting I consider
not whether a CDHP was offered but whether there was actual enrollment in any CDHP in
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market j at time t:
log(premiumi jt) = α ∗CDpresent jt +Xi jt ∗β1 ++X jt ∗β2 +δt + γ j + ε (2.2)
Since the presence of a CDHP varies at the CBSA level and actual CDHP listings vary
at the state level, standard errors should be clustered at least by CBSA or by state. Using
the larger standard errors from clustering, the coefficient becomes non-significant. I also
include fixed effects δ for years and γ for states. Results are presented in Table 2.9.
FEHBP classifies HMOs by their level of generosity into the categories basic, standard,
and high. Most HMOs offer a high and standard option. I include plans without a specified
generosity level as “standard.” In some regressions, I include dummies for plan level, as
well as the interaction of plan level and CDHP presence. I also create a variable (referred
to as rank2 in the table) that is the plan’s percentile ranking relative to other plans in its
market.
2.5.3 Regional Markets within States
I next refine the market definition to capture better the amount of potential competition faced
by each HMO. Although HMOs in the FEHBP plan listings are grouped by state, many
HMOs have networks that cover only a region within a state. Based on the plan descriptions
in OPM’s open season booklet, I divided each state into sub-regions. This is an inexact
science. The reach of each network depends on the carrier, rather than any standardized
regions defined by FEHBP. For example, one carrier divides California into northern and
southern coverage areas, while another distinguishes between the San Francisco area and
the Los Angeles area. As a rule of thumb, if at least one insurance carrier in the state lists a
separate plan for each of two cities that are a two-hour drive away from each other, then I
consider those two regions to be separate markets. The number of regional markets in a
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state ranges from 1 to 10.
I estimate Equation 1, instead using subscript j to represent regions within states, and
regression results are shown in Table 2.9. Again, the coefficient for CDHP availability and
for the number of CDHPs available are positive but non-significant when regressed on the
premiums of local HMOs.
2.6 Frequency of Plan Switching
Employees become less likely to switch plans the longer they have worked, suggesting
that strong inertia or a successful match result in search and switching costs exceeding the
potential benefits of a different plan. I observe a persistent pattern of plan-switching by
categorizing employees by year of hire (see Table 2.5). Even disregarding switches between
individual and family enrollment for the same product, as well as ignoring employees who
gain or lose eligibility for the federal benefits program, about 11% of employees change
health plans in any given year. During the 10 years of data I have, 15% of employees
switched plans within the first year of their employment. By five years of employment,
switching tapers off to about around 11%, then plateaus at 10%.
However, the introduction of CDHPs and HDHPs in the mid-2000s does not appear
to have affected the frequency of switching. Even if adverse selection were happening in
the form of healthier consumers sorting themselves out of HMOs and into CDHPs, the
magnitude of the migration toward CDHPs may be too small to detect any impact on HMO
premiums.
The existence of the CDHP may not be enough to affect either consumer or carrier
behavior. CDHP take-up is small, especially in the early years. Newer employees are
more likely to consider newly available plan options and switch plans. At all ages, older
employees are less likely to switch plans in any given year. Most movement between plan
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Table 2.5: Percentage of Employees Who Switched Plans, by Year Hired
Year hired
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2001 0.162
2002 0.097 0.150
2003 0.103 0.141 0.144
2004 0.096 0.121 0.124 0.156
2005 0.072 0.101 0.105 0.136 0.148
2006 0.074 0.104 0.111 0.129 0.142 0.134
2007 0.084 0.101 0.104 0.115 0.123 0.117 0.139
2008 0.088 0.112 0.115 0.129 0.136 0.127 0.151 0.163
2009 0.091 0.110 0.109 0.118 0.125 0.112 0.124 0.135 0.153
Notes: Data source: OPM Central Personnel Data File. This table considers employees hired in years 2001 through 2009. Employees
are counted as switching plans if they are enrolled in a plan that is different from the next year’s plan. Remaining in the same plan
but changing from self-only to family coverage or vice-versa is not counted as switching. Columns are by hiring year; rows represent
calendar year switching activity.
types occurs between HMOs and FFS. For example, in 2004, only 548 people switched
from an HMO to a CDHP, compared with 21,504 who left HMOs for one of the national
fee-for-service plans.
2.7 Evidence of selection among HMOs
A related question for this market is: what is the extent of adverse selection among HMOs?
If selection is occurring, then the the market will sustain a range of premium levels. The
greater the number of plans in the market, the steeper the premium schedule will become
as the enrollee population becomes increasingly fragmented.
The FEHBP is an imperfectly competitive market. One way to think about the variety
of plans offered is in terms of overall generosity of benefits. In a Hotelling-type framework,
firms pick a location along a continuum of consumers ordered by willingness to pay for
generous benefits, or ordered from healthiest to sickest. The more plans there are in a
market, the narrower will be the population segments captured by each. Those markets
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with greater numbers of plans should also have higher most-expensive premiums and a
lower least-expensive premiums on average. Moreover, if the marginal entrant to a market
is also the least generous, the premiums of all incumbent plans should increase.
Additionally, assuming that that carriers charge a mark-up on the services they provide,
as a market grows more competitive, the mark-up should decrease. As more plans enter
a market, I would expect that the lowest premiums will decrease and the change in the
highest premium will depend on the relative magnitudes of two effects: lower mark-ups
and increasing risk fragmentation.
Although I do not detect strong signs of CDHP vs. HMO competition, I check whether
HMO pricing patterns at least reflect competition from other HMOs. As a simple test of
this I looked at how the average, minimum and maximum plan premiums in each market
related to the number of plans offered. Similar to the previous sections, I look at plan i in
year t in market j:
log(premium jt) = α ∗numberHMOs jt +Xit ∗β2 +δt + γ j + ε (2.3)
If selection is occurring among HMOs and each plan is taking a different segment of the
risk spectrum, then premiums should reflect the demographics of enrollees. The premium
of the least generous plan—which enrolls the healthiest segment of the market—should be
decreasing in the number of plans. The most generous plan’s premium should be increasing
as its market share shrinks.
For both CBSA-based and region-based markets, more plans in a market are associated
with higher maximum premiums and lower minimum premiums. The difference between
the highest and lowest premium increases by 6% for every additional plan. (See Tables
2.11, 2.12, and 2.13 at the end of this chapter.)
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2.8 Conclusion
Even though consumer-driven and high-deductible health plans do appear to attract younger,
healthier consumers, as conventional wisdom predicts, their market share appears too small
to have any detectable effect on premiums of competing plans. Federal workers do not
appear to be gravitating toward CDHPs, and growing CDHP enrollment is in part due to new
hires rather than plan switching among veteran employees. In the longer run, if consumers’
plan preferences are inertial and new employees tend to pick CDHPs, the selection could
become more pronounced as older employees retire and the healthiest of the new employees
select CDHP. On the other hand, if all consumers exhibit inertia throughout their life spans,
then the now-young employees may never switch to traditional plans as they age.
What I analyze here is the specific experience of one health insurance exchange. In
the FEHBP, CDHPs were offered but not favored by OPM. In the FEHBP, had CDHPs
become more popular, my tests for selection might have produced different results. In the
FEHBP, the premium subsidy formula is not plan-specific. In fact, CDHP are arguably less
generously subsidized than other FEHBP plans since a CDHP premium is a relatively small
share of the plan’s total cost to the consumer. It appears that CDHPs could gain a large
share of the FEHBP market as new employees are hired and give greater consideration to
the full range of available plan types.
If CDHPs do generate cost savings, then employers would do well to nudge employees
toward consumer-driven options, perhaps by subsidizing them at a more generous rate than
traditional plans. In that case, CDHPs would stand a better chance at gaining market share
and their tendency to drive selection may be greater.
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2.9 Appendix: Data Sources
2.9.1 Central Personnel Data File extract, 2001-2010
The U.S. Office of Personnel Management provided information from personnel records for
the years 2001-2010. I have unique pseudo employee IDs that allow me to link employees
from year to year into longitudinal data. Other variables I have include birth year and
month, a pseudo agency ID, geographic location (CBSA), and choice of heath plan (3-digit
plan code). The 3-digit health plan codes include special codes for employees who have
declined enrollment, are not eligible for federal benefits, have a special, agency-sponsored
plan, or have not yet made a choice. The code contains information on what specific plan
was selected, as well as whether the employee chose self-only or family coverage.
The CPDF contains only information on active employees and does not include retires
and annuitants. My extract may also exclude agencies and departments with roles in
national security or which have independent record-keeping systems, such as the U.S.
Postal Service or the Congress. After excluding employees with multiple jobs, missing
year codes and missing pseudo-ID numbers, the CPDF extract contains a total of about 1.5
million employees per year, or about 15 million person-year observations. There are about
2.3 million unique individuals ever employed during the time period, 34% of whom are
employed for all 10 years. The CBSA is masked for security reasons for about 7.7 million
of the employee-year observations.
2.9.2 Health Plan Characteristics, 2001-2012
This dataset was constructed from the OPM publication RI 70-1: Guide to Federal Benefits
for Federal Civilian Employees, a booklet distributed annually to federal employees and
made available in both paper and digital formats. The booklet lists health plans in three
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distinct sections: (1) nationally available fee-for-service plans, (2) health maintenance
organizations and point-of-service plans, and (3) consumer-driven health plans. The last
section includes both high-deductible and consumer-driven health plans. Plans in the latter
two sections are listed by state, then alphabetically by name.
The booklet details all plans available in FEHBP. Each option is associated with a
unique, 3-digit code; the first two digits signify a plan’s benefit and cost-sharing structure
and the last digit identifies whether the option is for self-only or family coverage. All plans
are available for both the self-only and family variants.
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Table 2.6: Regression of State-Level Market Share of CDHPs on Premium Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
totgrow totgrow totgrow totgrow totgrow totgrow
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
CDHP share 0.003 0.079** 0.080** 0.077** 0.004 0.054**
(0.006) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.006) (0.023)
2005*CDHP share -0.054* -0.057* -0.046 -0.034
(0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.024)
2006*CDHP share -0.066** -0.069** -0.054* -0.044**
(0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.020)
2007*CDHP share -0.058** -0.060** -0.052* -0.034
(0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.023)
2008*CDHP share -0.073*** -0.075** -0.067** -0.050**
(0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.021)
2009*CDHP share -0.069** -0.070** -0.065** -0.046*
(0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.025)
2010*CDHP share -0.075** -0.078** -0.074** -0.053**
(0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.024)
Drug copay I 0.001* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Drug copay II -0.001 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Drug copay III -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
lag(premium growth) -0.252***
(0.051)
pct disabled -0.089
(0.083)
mean age -0.003
(0.003)
pct male -0.135**
(0.055)
no. of plans in state -0.000
(0.001)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1500 1500 1489 1315 1491 1500
* p ¡ .1, ** p ¡ .05, *** p ¡ .01
Notes: All regressions use robust standard errors with clustering at the state level. Last column uses state fixed effects instead of plan
fixed effects. Premium growth is expressed as the difference of the logarithm of the real premium (2011 dollars) and its value in the
previous year.
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Chapter 3
Thanks, Mom and Dad: Coverage and Selection among Young Adults after the
Affordable Care Act’s Dependent Coverage Expansion
3.1 Introduction
Included in the earliest wave of health insurance coverage expansions under the 2010
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was the provision that enabled parents to extend
health insurance coverage to dependents up to age 26. The law affected plans in both the
group and individual-purchase health insurance markets and was more sweeping than any
previous state law on dependent coverage for children.
Various surveys, including the American Communit3y Survey, show a dramatic post-
reform increase in insurance rates among young adults, both in absolute terms and also
relative to other age groups. An August 2013 report by Commonwealth Foundation
estimates that 7.8 million young adults who enrolled in their parents’ plan in the previous
12 months would not have been able to do so without the Affordable Care Act. The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services has estimated that over 3 million young adults
who would have otherwise been uninsured had gained coverage through the law (Sommers
and Kronick, 2012).
In the following chapter, I will show that the ACA’s dependent coverage provision
affected rates of young adult insurance, that the gains in coverage were through private
insurance and dependent coverage, and that the average health expenditures of young adult
enrollees in the market for private insurance decreased as a result.
This study is among the first wave of studies to use claims data to gauge the health
status of young adults who gained coverage under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The
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Figure 3.1: Rates of Uninsurance by Age Group, 2010 vs. 2011
Notes: Data source: 2008-2012 American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample.
new young adult dependents appear to come from both the pool of the uninsured as well
from among the previously insured (Antwi et al., 2013b). Using the MarketScan database,
I examine the presence of risk-based selection in the population of young adults insured as
dependents. I apply differences-in-differences analysis to claims data to examine changes
in the young adult population relative to other age groups, before and after the reform. In
this framework, I consider people ages 19 to 25 (hereafter referred to as “young adults”) as
the treatment group. Age 19 is a point at which many teens lose insurance due to aging
out of eligibility for Medicaid/CHIP or for parents’ private insurance plans (Collins and
Nicholson, 2010), and it was the age at which non-students lost dependent coverage prior
to the ACA. Under the ACA, plans are not required to cover dependent children beyond
age 26. I compare young adults newly eligible for dependent coverage to two other age
groups—adults a few years older and teens a few years younger—as a control population.
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3.2 The Impact of the ACA on Young Adult Coverage
The dependent coverage provision, one of the first ACA policies aimed at expanding health
coverage, opened new avenues for young adults to obtain insurance. Starting in September
2010, any plan offering coverage for dependents was required to offer coverage to child
dependents. The law broadened coverage among the so-called “young invincibles,” who
previously had one of the highest rates of uninsurance (Collins and Nicholson, 2010).
According to Census data, over 30 percent of young adults were uninsured prior to 2010—-
a much higher rate of uninsurance than any other age group. Enrolling young adults has
been a central pillar of the Affordable Care Act’s strategy for lessening the potential rate
shock stemming from the influx of individuals who previously were uninsured because
coverage was unaffordable or denied to them.1
In addition to expanding coverage, the law also potentially improved the health insurance
risk pool. An influx of younger, healthier enrollees into the insurance pool was seen as
key to balancing potential new older, sicker enrollees.2 The timing of the reform also gave
young adults—a relatively healthy population—a head start on obtaining coverage ahead of
other reforms designed to bring the uninsured into the health insurance risk pool. Other key
reforms enabling coverage among those who may have struggled to find coverage due to
poor health did not begin until later. Regulations establishing guaranteed issue and ending
pricing based on pre-existing conditions in the individual market took effect in 2014, as
did more broad-based coverage expansions through Medicaid and the health insurance
exchanges.
1For example, see the Washington Post story “Obama’s last campaign: Inside the White
House plan to sell Obamacare,” by Ezra Klein and Sarah Kliff, July 17, 2013. Available on-
line: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/17/obamas-last-campaign-inside-the-
white-house-plan-to-sell-obamacare/
2For example, see the July 2013 Associated Press story in the Denver Post titled “Health insurance carriers
fear many young people will opt to go without coverage,” available online: http://www.denverpost.com/
ci_23608130/health-insurance-fear-youth-opt-out.
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Survey data indicate a strong post-reform increase in insurance rates among young
adults. Both the American Community Survey and the Annual Social and Economic
Supplement to the Current Population Survey show increased coverage among young adults
in survey years after 2010, though no corresponding increase among other age groups (see
Figure 3.2).3 In the ACS, there is a similar increase for both relatively younger (ages
19-22) and relatively older (ages 23-25) young adults.
While the implementation of the ACA’s dependent coverage expansion coincided
with the beginnings of recovery from the Great Recession, other age groups did not
experience similar gains in the rate of coverage overall or of private coverage. The American
Community Survey shows that much of the drop in young adult uninsured is from expanded
private coverage (see Figure 3.3).
Previous federal law mandated that health insurance coverage be extended to dependents
according to the IRS definition, which includes children up to age 18 or age 23 if a student.
As of June 2010, 37 states had some sort of law on the books to provide health insurance for
child dependents beyond the federal requirements.4 Many of these laws had had “limited
reach” (Cantor et al., 2012). Many restricted young adult eligibility to children who were
residing in-state or with their parents, were disabled, or were full-time students. For
example, New York allowed child dependents up to age 30 as long as they were unmarried
3The March CPS asks respondents whether they were insured during the previous year, and if so, what
type of coverage they had. The March 2011 CPS shows an increase in insurance among young adults, since
the reform became effective during the previous year. The American Community Survey asks respondents
whether they are currently insured, thereby providing a point-in-time estimate of health insurance coverage.
The ACS questionnaire is administered year-round, and the public version of the ACS does not contain
information about when the respondent was surveyed. There is not a significant increase in insurance rates
among young adults in the 2010 ACS, in contrast to the 2011 Current Population Survey (which references
calendar year 2010). One explanation for this may be that CPS respondents are asked about their insurance
status over the previous year, so any respondents who were insured during the post-reform period are counted
as insured.
4The National Conference of State Legislatures has compiled a detailed list, which is avail-
able at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/dependent-health-coverage-state-
implementation.aspx.
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Figure 3.2: Insurance Rates by Age Group
Notes: Data source: 2008-2012 American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample.
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Figure 3.3: Young Adults by Primary Coverage Type
Notes: Data source: 2008-2012 American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample. Individuals are assigned to coverage
types using a hierarchy for primary insurance type.
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and a resident of the state.
In a study of three states that enacted adult dependent laws in 2005 or 2006, Claxton
et al. (2012) find a very small increase in young adult insurance rates (0.2 percent) relative
the states used as controls and four indications of better access to care. One study found
that even among young adults living at home, state laws allowing enrollment as dependents
increased insurance rates by only 3.84 percentage points (Monheit et al. 2011). Moreover,
state laws generally applied to the group insurance market and not private, self-insured
plans, the type of coverage that 60% of American workers have.5 Antwi et al. (2013b) do
not find any impact of state laws on pre-ACA uninsurance rates.
The new law on dependent coverage in the ACA is much broader in scope than nearly
any of the previous state-level regulations on dependent coverage. Both individual market
and group plans offering family coverage must extend coverage to young adults up to age
26—regardless of whether the young adult is married, living at home, childless, disabled,
or a student. The one exception to the ACA young adult provision is that until 2014
grandfathered plans that existed prior to the ACA do not have to accept young adult
dependents who are offered coverage through their own employers.6 The Kaiser Family
Foundation’s 2012 survey of employer health benefits found that 29 percent of firms
employing 3-199 workers and 90 percent of firms employing 200 or more workers had
enrolled at least one adult child dependent as a result of ACA changes (Kaiser Family
Foundation and the Health Research and Educational Trust, 2012).
With most insured Americans covered through employer-sponsored insurance, the
young adult provision had great potential for easing job lock (Gruber and Madrian, 2002).
Antwi et al. (2013b) find that job turnover rates increased by 1.5 percentage points among
5See the the government‘s issue brief at http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2012/
06/young-adults06192012a.html.
6Beginning in 2014, even grandfathered plans must make coverage available to all young adult dependents,
regardless of whether those dependents have the option of their own ESI.
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young adults, suggesting that the availability of parents’ ESI eased job-lock. Those under
26 also appear to work increasingly part time rather full time (Slusky, 2012). Slusky (2012)
also shows that young adults substitute two-year college for four-year institutions, which
typically provide insurance for students. Another possible benefit of the provision is that
eligibility for insurance allows young people to be more entrepreneurial (Bailey, 2013).7
3.2.1 Changes in Young Adult Private Coverage
The Truven Health Analytics MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounters Database
(referred to hereafter as simply “MarketScan”) contains information from private insurance
plans, most of which are employer-sponsored policies offered by large firms, with person-
level observations for tens of millions of enrollees. It contains inpatient, outpatient, and
prescription drug claims, allowing us to tally up an enrollee’s total expenditures over any
period as well as look for utilization of particular types of services. A major benefit of using
MarketScan for studying the young adult dependent coverage expansion is that MarketScan
indicates whether an individual is insured as an employee, a dependent child, or dependent
spouse.
I use the MarketScan data for the years 2007-2011, including basic demographic
characteristics from the enrollment file, outpatient claims, inpatient claims, and drug-related
claims. This interval provides us with three full pre-reform years and one full year of
post-reform data, in addition to the year that the law went into effect. In my analysis, I
generally treat 2010 as a pre-reform year because the dependent coverage provision affected
plans renewing after September 2010. If most employers offer a open enrollment period
7Anecdotally, one business newsletter reported “Before the law took effect this year, some young adults
say, the prospect of hefty health insurance bills (or of living without coverage) deterred them from starting
businesses. Removing the cost of insurance from these would-be business owners’ financial obligations freed
capital to invest in businesses and reduce the risk of entrepreneurship.” (See ”Parents’ Health Insurance a
Lifeline for Young Entrepreneurs,” by Joseph Shure, BusinessNewsDaily, Jun. 2011)
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Young Adults (Ages 19-25) by Relation to Plan Holder
Year Employee Dependent Spouse Dependent Child TOTAL
2007 49.4% 7.7% 42.9% 100.0%
2008 49.4% 7.4% 43.2% 100.0%
2009 45.9% 6.9% 47.3% 100.0%
2010 43.5% 6.5% 50.0% 100.0%
2011 35.8% 5.1% 59.1% 100.0%
Notes: Data source: MarketScan enrollment file. Full-year enrollees only.
near the end of the calendar year for coverage commencing on January 1 of the following
year, then most employees’ coverage would not renew until 2011.
3.2.2 Increased Enrollment of Dependents in Private Insurance
In addition to formerly uninsured young adults enrolling as child dependents on parents’
private plans, I suspect the dependent provision may have also resulted in insured young
adults dropping their own coverage in favor of their parents’. A recent study by the payroll
services firm ADP found that among firms with over 100 employees, 28.8 percent of all
employees under 30 are offered insurance but decline the offer, compared with about 20
percent for all other age groups. The study attributes the lower rate of take-up to younger
employee’s smaller incomes, option of parents’ ESI, and lower priority for insurance
coverage. The ADP study also finds that from 2010 to 2013, the participation of workers
under 30 in their employers’ insurance plans dropped by 2.6 percentage points.8
Because MarketScan is a convenience sample based on the calendar year, changes in
the raw counts of young adults enrolled in January 2011 to that of December 2010 may
8The ADP study is described in a news release dated June 26, 2013 from PR Newswire titled “ADP
Research Institute 2013 ADP Annual Health Benefits Report Reveals Young and Low Wage Workers Face the
Greatest Health Care Challenges.” Available at: http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/adp-
research-institute-2013-adp-annual-health-benefits-report-reveals-young-and-low-
wage-workers-face-the-greatest-health-care-challenges-213110431.html
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Table 3.2: Change on Previous Year in Distribution of Young Adults (Ages 19-25) by
Relation to Plan Holder
Year Employee Dependent Spouse Dependent Child
2008 0.0% -0.3% 0.3%
2009 -3.6% -0.5% 4.1%
2010 -2.3% -0.4% 2.7%
2011 -7.7% -1.4% 9.1%
Notes: Data source: MarketScan enrollment file. Full-year enrollees only.
reflect changes in enrollment among employees within firms in MarketScan as well as
changes in what firms are included in the data set for that particular year.9 While many
firms and individuals in MarketScan can be tracked across years, the firms which participate
in the database may differ from year to year, and MarketScan is not a true longitudinal
panel. Because of the limitations on comparing levels of enrollment across years, I analyze
changes in the enrollee pool as not just the number but also the proportion of young adults
age 19-25 of all enrollees ages 16-29, as well as the proportion by dependent status within
those age groups.
The MarketScan data show no sharp increase in young adult dependents until January
2011. Using the MarketScan enrollment file, I tabulated monthly enrollment numbers for
young adults by relation to the employee who is the planholder, including both full-year and
partial-year enrollees. MarketScan contains four categories for an enrollee’s relationship
to the policyholder: employee (i.e., self), child dependent, spouse dependent, and other
dependent.10 Figure 3.4 shows enrollment by dependent status for young adults age 19-25.
Each of the enrollment types shows annual patterns when individuals are grouped by the
age given in the enrollment file. The number of child dependents decreases over the course
9Truven Health Analytics produces survey weights to inflate MarketScan to a national sample, but these
weights were not available for this project.
10I do not observe any individuals coded as “other dependents” among the young adults and controls for
the MarketScan years used in this study.
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Figure 3.4: Young Adult Private Insurance Enrollment by Dependent Status
Notes: Data source: MarketScan, 2007-2011. Monthly enrollment by age at time of enrollment, for both full-year and partial-year
enrollees ages 19-25.
of the year as young people gain their own insurance coverage through school or work or
age out of a parent’s plan. Conversely, the proportion of spouse-dependent young adults
increases over the course of the year.
The most pronounced trend among privately insured young adults in MarketScan for
the period is an increase in the number of covered child dependents and a decrease of
young adults with their own ESI, consistent with the Antwi et al. (2013b) study using
the Survey of Income and Program Participation. While young adults in MarketScan are
equally divided among their own and a parent’s plan in 2007-08, a larger number of those
with private insurance are child dependents starting in 2009. This change may be at least
77
partly attributable to the economic downturn, during which young adults were more likely
to lose their jobs than people of their parents’ generation (Johnson and Butrica, 2012).
Although the dependent coverage provision took effect on September 23, 2010,11 the
greatest change in plan enrollment in MarketScan appears between December 2010 and
January 2011, when insurance policy renewals likely coincided with the new calendar
year. Among the 3.8 million young adult dependents who enrolled after January 2010 and
remained enrolled through the end of the year, 3.1 million (81.5%) enrolled in the month of
December, suggesting that the dependent coverage provision’s impact hit at the end of the
calendar year rather than in September.
In December 2010, 42.2% of young adults in MarketScan are employee planholders
and 51.2% are child dependents. In January 2011, only 30.7% are the primary plan holder
and 64.9% are covered as a child dependent. The proportion who are child dependents
remains above 60% over the course of the 2011. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the distribution of
young adult full-year enrollees ages 19-25 by dependent status. While the trend over the
period is a shift from own-coverage to dependent child coverage, no year-to-year change is
as large as from 2010 to 2011.
3.3 Changes in Young Adult Health Expenditures and Utilization
Already, the dependent coverage provision has been shown to improve access to care.Sommers
et al. (2013), drawing upon evidence from the National Health Interview Survey, found that
people ages 19-25 were less likely to report delaying or not receiving care due to cost and
more likely to report having a usual source of care after the dependent coverage provision.
Another question that can be answered with the claims data is: do the types of services
11The Obama administration announced in spring 2010 that 65 issuers had voluntarily agreed to allow
early enrollment of young adult dependents on order to minimize possible coverage gaps between high school
or college graduation and September 2010.
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demanded by the newly insured differ from those previously used? In addition to affecting
the extent of healthcare utilization, the option for dependent coverage may have also
changed young adults’ choice of provider settings. Mulcahy et al. (2013) show that after the
reform, young adults ages 19-25 accounted for a smaller share of emergency departments
nationwide in the post-law period, and those who did visit an ED were more likely to
be covered by private insurance than before. Similarly, Miller (2012) finds that after
Massachusetts health reform, non-urgent ED visits declined. On the other hand, Antwi
et al. (2013a) find that hospital visits increased by 3.5 percent among young adults ages
23-25 after the dependent coverage provision, for both emergency and non-emergency
hospitalizations, based on analysis of inpatient records nationwide. Similar to Mulcahy
et al. (2013), they find a reduction in uninsurance among young adults with inpatient visits.
Based on the claims of employees of one large firm, Fronstin (2013) finds that that the
utilization patterns of the newly insured young adults differ from those of their previously
insured peers. The newly insured are more likely have claims for mental health, substance
abuse, and pregnancy related services. Their expenditures total 15 percent more per capita
than the previously insured for 2011.
Recent coverage expansions have not consistently produced evidence of pent-up demand.
SHADAC (2005), which surveyed the literature for the state of Arizona, found conflicting
evidence on whether the previously uninsured exhibit pent-up demand after obtaining
coverage. Finkelstein et al. (2012) argue that although preliminary results from the first
year of the Oregon health insurance experiment, in which Medicaid coverage was provided
to a randomized subset of applicants, showed higher utilization among the newly covered,
the pattern of utilization in the first six months of coverage was not suggestive of pent-up
demand. Martin et al. (1997) found evidence of pent-up demand among the newly insured
who gained coverage through Washington state’s Basic Health Plan program. Individuals
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Table 3.3: Mean Expenditures by Child Dependents
Age Group 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Age 16-18 $1,872 $1,902 $2,057 $2,020 $2090
(9,854) (9,204) (11,468) (12,736) (11,319)
Age 19-25 $1,826 $1,902 $2,029 $2,081 $2,124
(9,876) (10,688) (12,061) (11,905) (12,340)
Age 26-29 $5,178 $4,129 $4,826 $8,585 $8,712
(19,600) (18,889) (26,742) (36,729) (39,738)
Notes: Data Source: MarketScan. Standard deviations in parentheses. All amounts in 2007 real dollars. Full-year enrollees only.
who were previously uninsured for more than one year had higher expenditures relative to
other Basic Health Plan enrollees but overall expenditures were similar to those of state
government employees.
Table 3.3 shows mean spending by dependent status by year. Annual expenditure is
particularly high among older child dependents above the usual cutoff age (e.g., those
over 23 pre-ACA and those over 26 post-ACA). This is likely because these adults qualify
precisely because of severe health issues: several states have laws to allow adults to
remain covered as child dependents regardless of age if those children are unable to seek
employment due to disability or medical condition.
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy: Differences-in-Differences
Using the monthly enrollment indicators in MarketScan, I examine the patterns in enroll-
ment among individuals ages 16-29. To examine selection, I use differences-in-differences
estimation to compare claims data among young people, comparing groups affected and
unaffected by the dependent coverage law both before and after the reform took effect.
It is unclear a priori what the direction of selection, if any, might be. On the one
hand, low-income young adults would have been most likely to be uninsured before the
reform, and the dependent coverage provision could have the effect of bringing less healthy
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individuals into the risk pool. On the other hand, the young adults who stood to benefit from
the law were likely financially better off than their uninsured peers and possibly healthier
as well. Practically speaking, the uninsured young adults most likely to gain from the
reform were those with at least one parent with full-time employment and, therefore, ESI.
Survey data show that only half of uninsured young adults had parents with ESI (Collins
and Nicholson, 2010).
A few studies have looked for selection among young adults who moved into private
insurance due to the ACA. Sommers et al. (2013) use the information on self-reported
health from the Current Population Survey’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement to
determine which young adults were first to seek insurance in 2012. They find that the first
to join as dependents were those in worse health, while those who reported excellent health
were slower to enroll.
Using the MarketScan claims, we can track the total health expenditures of young adults
and detect the precise date that enrollment began. While we cannot observe the pre-ACA
health care expenditures of young adults without private insurance, we can make inferences
based on the average expenditures of young adults ages 19-25 relative to those of people
just below or above that age range. For example, the average 25-year-old should not differ
much from the average 26-year-old, but only 25-year-olds gained a potential new option for
coverage.
To examine how the risk composition of young adults with private insurance may have
been affected by the ACA, I estimate variations on the model:
ln(expendituresi jt) = β0 +β1×YAlawit +β2(YAlawt×ageit)+Xi jtβ +γt +δ j +ε (3.1)
where i is an individual in state j in year t. YAlawt is a dummy indicating whether the
individual is treated: it is set equal to 1 for a young adult aged 19-25 in 2011 and 0 otherwise.
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Control variables include individual characteristics Xi jt , state fixed effects δ jt , age-specific
effects and year fixed effects γt . The main coefficient of interest is β1, the effect of being a
young adult in the post-reform period. I consider health expenditures in this case to be a
proxy for health status.12
I do not hypothesize that the reform changed the health expenditures of individual
young adults but do expect that the composition of the risk pool was affected by the ACA.
Survey data, as discussed earlier, suggest the expansion of dependent coverage spurred a
net flow of young adults from uninsured to covered, effectively adding “good” risk to the
pool of covered young adults.
A number of states had pre-ACA state laws regarding dependent coverage, although
it is unclear whether such laws substantially affected insurance rates among young adults.
Levine et al. (2011), in their study of SCHIP expansion, estimate that state laws on
dependent coverage raise insurance rates among young adults by 3.3 percentage points.
The authors find that state laws generate “reverse crowd-out,” encouraging eligible young
people to move off of public insurance and into their parents’ private plans. Moreover,
more generous rules about dependent coverage increase the probability that adult children
reside with their parents, a common restriction for dependent coverage. For this reason,
and to control for other state-level factors that may affect ESI offer rates and takeup, the
model includes state fixed effects.
Differences-in-differences results show that average expenditure per capita for young
adults significantly declines in the post-reform period. Results are shown in Table 3.4, and
a graphical representation is in Figure 3.5. The largest changes are a decrease in average
expenditure among ages 23-25, the young adults who would have been least likely to qualify
12I do not directly compare dependents alone before and after the reform because the pre-ACA extentions
of dependent coverage beyond age 23 were narrow in scope and many were aimed at those who were unable
to seek employment due to disability—in other words, atypically poor health.
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Figure 3.5: Change in Average Annual Expenditure by Age, 2008-2010 vs. 2011
Notes: Data source: MarketScan. Differences correspond the sum of the YAlaw and age interaction terms in Model 4 shown in Table
3.4.
as dependents under previous law and who would have been, therefore, most affected by
new coverage options. This suggests that the risk pool of young adult dependents became
relatively healthier after the dependent coverage provision took effect.
3.3.2 Expenditure by Enrollment Status: Own Plan vs. Child Dependents
In addition to looking at changes to the risk pool of young adults overall, I also look
for changes in average expenditures in the subset of young adults who have their own
insurance—in other words, those not covered as dependents. As a thought experiment,
I think about young adults with own ESI before the reform as revealing themselves as
one of two types based upon their choice for post-reform coverage. In this framework,
those I nickname “stayers” remain on their own plans. The reason for staying might be
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Table 3.4: Effect of Dependent Coverage Provision on Expenditure by Age
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
YA law -0.062*** -0.147*** -0.045*** -0.134***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
YA law * Age 19 0.170*** 0.159***
(0.008) (0.007)
YA law * Age 20 0.191*** 0.182***
(0.008) (0.007)
YA law * Age 21 0.176*** 0.156***
(0.008) (0.008)
YA law * Age 22 0.097*** 0.118***
(0.008) (0.008)
YA law * Age 23 0.007 0.034***
(0.008) (0.008)
YA law * Age 24 -0.129*** -0.094***
(0.008) (0.008)
Female 1.689*** 2.896***
(0.001) (0.089)
Constant 5.736*** 5.736*** 2.896*** 2.896***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.089) (0.089)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.009 0.009 0.091 0.091
N 26,735,586 26,735,586 26,735,586 26,735,586
Notes: Full-year enrollees age 16-29 in MarketScan enrollment file for years 2008-2011. Dependent variable is the log of total annual
expenditures for full-year enrollees. YA law is a dummy variable equal to 1 for individuals age 19-25 in year 2011 and 0 otherwise. YA
law * Age 19-24 are interaction terms for YA law and age in the enrollment file, and the interaction term for age 25 is omitted.
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lack of a parent with ESI, the value of own coverage compared with other options, or the
cost of switching. Stayers’ behavior is not altered by the young adult dependent coverage
provision, although many stayers may have had a new coverage option available to them.
“Leavers,” on the other hand, terminate their own-employer coverage to join a parent’s
plan, perhaps motivated by lower premiums or more generous benefit structures. If leavers’
choices are driven by a desire for more generous coverage, then I would expect they have
higher average health care expenditures compared with stayers.
Staying and leaving is not directly observable in MarketScan. It is not possible to track
an individual if he or she moves from one employer to another, or changes from coverage
as a dependent to coverage as an employee. While there is a clear increase in the number of
young adult dependents starting in 2011, I cannot determine whether the new dependents
were previously on their own ESI, were uninsured, or had other types of coverage. Instead,
I test for differences between leavers and stayers by testing if expenditures among young
adults who are the primary policyholder decrease after the ACA expanded young adult
dependent coverage.
I do find a decrease in average expenditures among young adults enrolled as an employee
planholder in the post-policy period (stayers), relative to the average in the pre-reform
period. (See Table 3.5.) This decrease appears at each age from 19 to 25, inclusive.
However, the decrease is most pronounced among those ages 19-21 and less so among
ages 22-25. Regression results for stayers are shown in Table 3.5, and the corresponding
graphical representation of the effect by age is in Figure 3.6.
3.4 Study Limitations
The study design in the analysis presented here assumes that the treatment group for the
dependent coverage provision is young adults ages 19 to 25. Interpreted strictly, however,
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Table 3.5: Effect of Dependent Coverage Provision on Non-Dependent Expenditure by Age
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
YA law -0.115*** -0.046*** -0.096*** -0.042***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
YA law * Age 19 -0.331*** -0.275***
(0.023) (0.021)
YA law * Age 20 -0.277*** -0.208***
(0.017) (0.016)
YA law * Age 21 -0.227*** -0.163***
(0.014) (0.013)
YA law * Age 22 -0.130*** -0.010***
(0.011) (0.010)
YA law * Age 23 -0.072*** -0.058***
(0.010) (0.009)
YA law * Age 24 -0.013*** -0.016*
(0.009) (0.008)
Female 2.299*** 2.299***
(0.002) (0.891)
Constant 5.802*** 5.801*** 3.449*** 3.449***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.137) (0.137)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.007 0.007 0.151 0.151
N 12,174,474 12,174,474 12,174,474 12,174,474
Notes: Full-year enrollees age 16-29 in MarketScan enrollment file for years 2008-2011. Dependent variable is the log of total annual
expenditures for full-year enrollees. YA law is a dummy variable equal to 1 for individuals age 19-25 in year 2011 and 0 otherwise. YA
law * Age 19-24 are interaction terms for YA law and age in the enrollment file, and the interaction term for age 25 is omitted.
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Figure 3.6: Change in Average Annual Expenditure by Age among Non-Dependents,
2008-2010 vs. 2011
Notes: Data source: MarketScan. Differences correspond the sum of the YAlaw and age interaction terms in Model 4 shown in Table
3.4.
the dependent coverage provision requires coverage for dependent children through the day
before the child’s 26th birthday. In practice, however, many employer plans may be more
generous, extending coverage through the end of the month or calendar year of the 26th
birthday to minimize administrative burden. Furthermore, the value of dependent coverage
that extends beyond the 26th birthday is excluded from an employee’s taxable income for
that entire calendar year. United HealthCare, for example, stated that its standard is to cover
dependent children through the last day of the month in which the child turns 26, but that
individual plans may set their own rules to further extend coverage.13 Those individuals
whose age is 25 in the MarketScan enrollment file are likely not 25 throughout the entire
year I observe them.
13The United HealthCare document from September 2010 titled “Coverage for Dependents to Age 26”
is available online at: http://www.uhc.com/live/uhc_com/Assets/Documents/Dependents26.pdf.
One alterative United suggests is that plans could choose to cover young adults through the entire calendar
year of their 26th birthday.
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Future work on this topic should also incorporate newer claims data to check whether
the lower average expenditures among young adults are persistent. At the time of this
analysis, I had available to me only one year of data in the period after the dependent
coverage provision took effect. MarketScan is a rich dataset, and there is also potential
to study whether the types of services used by young adults changed in the post-reform
period.
3.5 Conclusion
On net, the ACA’s dependent coverage provision brought “good risk” into the private
insurance risk pool. The dependent coverage provision generated increases in young
adult health insurance rates, and these gains were achieved through expansion of private
insurance coverage. Analysis of claims data suggests that the young adults newly insured
as dependents had lower health expenditures than the previously insured young adults.
While the moral hazard effect of gaining dependent coverage may have lead to greater
health care utilization for any particular individual who had been uninsured or on his or her
own insurance policy, average expenditures for young adults on private insurance decreased
after the dependent coverage provision, particularly among the age group which would not
have qualified for dependent coverage under most circumstances in the pre-policy period. I
also find evidence suggesting that less-healthy young adults may have migrated from their
own plans to parents’ coverage. Among non-dependent young adults, average expenditure
decreases in the first post-reform year.
The effects of the dependent coverage provision on average risk may not be generaliz-
able to the ACA’s overall expansion of coverage. Those who had the potential to benefit
from the dependent coverage provision in 2010-11 were a relatively well-off group–young
adults whose parents had access to ESI. Moreover, the forces previously keeping young
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adults uninsured likely included price sensitivity and a sense of invincibility, while older
uninsured Americans may have been locked out of the market due to having pre-existing
health conditions, being priced out or being unable to obtain underwriting. But because
young adults were given a head start in obtaining coverage ahead of other insurance industry
reforms in the ACA, the expanded insurance among young people may counter potential
premium rate shock.
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